THE FORTNIGHTLY

DECEMBER, 1941

JAPAN'S INTENTIONS

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I. JAPANESE EXPANSION

MR. MATSUOKA when defending at Geneva the Japanese seizure of Manchuria said that the League had no more loyal servant than Japan and that "Japanese military action in Manchuria was an act of self defence." "Japan," he added, "was ready to be crucified for her opinions and risk incurring the severest sanctions of the League rather than alter her standpoint in Geneva."

Japan is one of those countries which has pursued a long term foreign policy and the fundamental aim of that policy is expansion. Anyone who takes the trouble to study the early history of Japan before the period of seclusion which lasted roughly for 250 years from about 1600-1850 will find that in the sixteenth century the Japanese were already then imbued with the same ideas of expansion which they have to-day. A distinguished Japanese historian, Professor Komo in the second volume of his book *Japanese Expansion in the Asiatic Continent*, says:

> The aim of Hideyoshi—a great Japanese Dictator who died in 1598 when attempting to conquer Korea—was to create a huge Asiatic Empire including Japan, Korea, China, India, Persia and such other Asiatic nations as were known to the Japanese in those days, as well as all the islands near the continent such as the Liu Chiu, Formosa and the Philippines and other islands in the South Sea. He planned first to extend his authority over China, Japan and Korea with the surrounding islands and to make them the first unit of his Empire.

His death was followed by the rise to power of that unique dynasty of dictators, the Tokugawa Shoguns, who originally from fear of Spain and distrust of the Spanish missionaries embarked on the policy of seclusion which resulted in Japan being shut off from contact with the outside world for two and a half centuries. Hideyoshi's grandiose programme of expansion was laid aside but it was not forgotten, and about 1850 when the long period of seclusion was drawing to an end and the Shogunate was shortly destined to disappear in the clash with western civilization, an advocate of expansion came for-

ward, one Yoshida Shoin, who again put forth a programme of foreign conquest to include Formosa, Korea, Manchuria, Saghalin, Kamchatka and Eastern Siberia.

This programme was less ambitious and much more limited than that of Hideyoshi, but it was more practicable and 40 years later the wheels were set in motion and war was declared on China in order to supplant her as the suzerain Power in Korea and to obtain a footing in Manchuria. This was really the beginning of the policy of the "New Order in Eastern Asia" though no country realized it at the time and the name had not yet been invented. Nearly 40 years more were to pass before it at length began to dawn on an unbelieving world that Japan having seized Manchuria and attached Shanghai not only contemplated the domination of China but was preparing to challenge the established position of the white man in the Far East.

Since the *Coup d'état* in Manchuria in September, 1931, Japanese policy has been dictated by the army and the Japanese Government has been subservient to the dictates of the military hierarchy. In 1934 the whole press in unison with the politicians were chanting the same refrain that Japan and Japan alone was responsible for the peace of Eastern Asia. The year before Japan had withdrawn from the League of Nations, but it was left to Mr. Amau, the official spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Office, who is to-day Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, to drop the bomb which resounded throughout Europe and the United States.

In the course of a statement to the foreign journalists in Tokyo in April, 1934, Mr. Amau said:

> Although Japan's attitude towards China may be at variance with that of other countries, these divergencies cannot be helped as they arise from Japan's position and mission. Japan is ever mindful of maintaining and promoting friendly relations with all countries, but it is only right that for the maintenance of peace and order in the Far East she should act independently on her own responsibility. It is Japan's mission to achieve peace and she is determined to do so. There is no other country than China with which she can share the responsibility for maintaining peace in the Far East. If China should attempt to exclude Japan or by exploiting the influence of other Powers take steps detrimental to the peace of the Far East, Japan would be forced to oppose such measures. Again should the Powers, in view of the situation arising from what has happened in Manchuria and Shanghai attempt to act in concert in regard to China, such action would acquire political significance. Even if its professed object is only to help China economically, Japan cannot but oppose any such development.

The Japanese Government when pressed for an explanation

pretended that this statement did not mean what it said and in any case was not official. Great Britain was then recovering from the great depression, appeasement was the policy though the name had not yet been applied to it, Sir John Simon was Foreign Secretary, Japan was a long way off and the very idea of war was taboo. And so Japan again won the round. She had directly claimed suzerainty over China and had not been seriously challenged.

One phrase in the Amau statement is of special interest: "It is Japan's *mission* to achieve peace and she is determined to do so." The Japanese race, we are told, is descended through their first Emperor from the Sun Goddess Amaterasu, and has a special mission on this earth. They claim in fact to be the chosen race whose mission it is one day to dominate the world. General Araki had already proclaimed the doctrine of "Kodo" or "the way of the Emperor" the year before when he was Minister of War, and the substance of a speech in which the General outlined his ideas was published by the *Japan Chronicle* on March 16, 1933. It is enlightening to recall some of his remarks which may be said to represent the views of the military hierarchy which to-day controls the Government in Tokyo.

> As a divine country in the Eastern Seas and the senior nation of Asia, Japan's aspirations are great and her responsibility is heavy. Each single shot must be impregnated with Kodo and the point of every bayonet tempered with the national virtue . . . . We have no hesitation in declaring that we are a military nation—in the cause of Kodo and the highest morality . . . . What is the present state of the East? India with its population of 300,000,000 lives in dire misery under Britain's oppressive rule. There is no vestige of liberty left in the fertile plains of Central Asia and Siberia. The countries of the Far East are the object of pressure on the part of the white races. But awakened Japan can no longer tolerate further tyranny and oppression at their hands. It is the duty of the Emperor's country to oppose with determination the actions of any Power, however strong, if they are not in accordance with Kodo . . . . We Japanese are not afraid of blood nor do we fear to lay down our lives for justice. It is the Imperial House round which we centre. Herein lies the supreme virtue of the Imperial House. His Majesty *is* Japanese morality and to assist in promoting the prosperity of the Imperial House and the spread of Japanese morality is the basic principle of our existence.

Six years earlier General Baron Tanaka who became Prime Minister in 1928 addressed a memorial to the Emperor in which he said:

> In order to conquer China, we must first conquer Manchuria and Mongolia. In order to conquer the world we must first conquer China. If we can conquer China, all other Asiatic countries and the countries of the South Seas will fear us and capitulate before us. The

world will then understand that Eastern Asia is ours. With all the resources of China at our disposal, we shall pass on to the conquest of India . . . . One day we shall have to fight against the United States of America. If we are to gain control over China we must crush the United States.

The Tanaka memorial was declared to be a forgery, but if its origin is a mystery, it is rather like the mystery surrounding the end of Chang-tso-lin who was killed by the explosion of a bomb under his carriage at a point on the railway specially guarded by Japanese troops.

In any case the memorial only repeats once again what Japanese Generals have repeatedly said. In January of this year a manifesto was published in the Japanese Press signed by many Admirals and Generals including General Hayashi, a former Prime Minister:

500,000,000 people in Annam, Cochin China, The East Indies, the Malay Peninsular, Burmah, India and the Philippines are now groaning under injustice. South East Asia has been invaded and conquered by the whites for the past seven centuries. The emancipation of these people is essential for the construction of the New Order in Asia and the establishment of lasting peace in the East.

Within the past month the Japanese Minister of Finance is reported in the press to have said:

Japan is not entirely free from danger should it fail to choose the proper path. It is Japan's aim to force Britain and the United States to retreat from Eastern Asia.

In more diplomatic language, Baron Hiranuma, the Japanese Prime Minister in 1939, speaking of the "China Incident" which had then been in progress for two years said:

Rumours to the effect that the national policy of Japan is imperialistic and aggressive are to be deplored . . . It is ignorance of the true motives of Japan that leads to such unfounded rumours. Since the foundation of the nation our aim has been peace and security. The national policy of Japan is benevolence directed towards the good development of all. We wish to extend this spirit first to our nationals, then to Eastern Asia, then to the rest of the world.

When Baron Hiranuma speaks of "peace and security being the aims of Japan" his meaning is perfectly clear. Security from invasion and peace in Japan are to be assured by imposing Japanese civilization on neighbouring countries, by placing them under Japanese protection and so rendering them harmless and by the elimination of the white man. The latter is an integral part of the conception of the Japanese New Order which is really an extension of the former Pan-Asia movement that for years past had been sponsored by extreme Japanese

Nationalists. It was after the French collapse in June, 1940, that the New Order for Eastern Asia was officially enlarged by Mr. Matsuoka, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, into the New Order for Greater East Asia.

Admirals in Japan, as a rule, talk less than the Generals, but I will give one more quotation—from a naval source—though the author is not an Admiral but a retired Lieutenant-Commander named Ishimaru. In 1935 a book was published under the title of *Japan must fight Britain* which caused some embarrassment to the Japanese Government:

> England is on the down grade. Japan has started on the up grade. The two must come into collision because England is trying to hold on to what she has, while Japan must perforce expand. Territorial resources England has in abundance; she can afford to relinquish some. Japan has insufficient, and to her they are a matter of life and death. England had better swallow her pride, make concessions, and avoid a struggle. The Empire of the Rising Sun must have full freedom in Manchuria and China, and find open doors and open arms in Australia . . . . Should Britain not understand the elementary components of the present problem, Japan would profit by the weakening of the British Empire, the apathy of the Dominions and the weakness and decadence of the British Navy; she would suddenly attack the navy when it is scattered throughout the seven seas. Australia and New Zealand would be the first aims of Japanese conquest. Hongkong would be taken quickly and India would be helped by invasion.

Now these quotations from the writings and speeches of public men in Japan, if read together can lead to but one conclusion: Japan is determined to dominate Eastern and South Eastern Asia and gradually to extend her sway westwards. As she advances the white man is to be driven back. Moreover Japan is not prepared to compromise on what is referred to as Japan's fundamental policy. And behind this policy is the idea of Japan's divine mission to dominate the world and bring peace on earth—a Japanese peace. It is time that all illusions on the subject should be swept away and that we should be prepared to accept this challenge.

II. Anglo-Japanese Relations

The Anglo-Japanese alliance was concluded in 1902 less than fifty years after Great Britain had first entered into official relations with Japan. Twenty years later it came to an end. During the brief period of intercourse with Japan, our relations may be said to have passed through three phases:

(1) An early beginning of inevitable suspicion and friction which gradually gave way to a ludicrously false conception by the British public of Japan based largely on Gilbert and Sullivan's *Mikado*.

(2) A short-lived period of friendliness and co-operation arising out of the alliance, and the picture of the two island Empires in alliance at the extremities of Europe and Asia.

(3) Renewed friction and suspicion after the termination of the Alliance, largely due to economic competition and growing jealousy in Japan of our established position in Eastern Asia.

Now gratitude in international relations is rare and when it occurs is usually of short duration. Japan has certainly reason to be grateful to Great Britain, if only for one thing. In 1905 we were allied to Japan. The Russo-Japanese war had started the previous year, and though the Japanese had been consistently successful, they were nearly at the end of their tether after the battle of Mukden. Peace negotiations were set on foot and through the good offices of President Theodore Roosevelt took place at Portsmouth in the U.S. When Mr. Witte, the chief Russian delegate, firmly stated that Russia would not cede one foot of territory nor pay one kopek of indemnity the negotiations appeared to have reached a deadlock. The Japanese were demanding not only a large indemnity but the cession of the island of Saghalin.

Whenever a complete deadlock intervenes in treaty negotiations between two countries, it is probable that both sides are bluffing, it is certain that one is. In this case both parties most urgently desired a settlement and it is known that in the last resort the Japanese were prepared to sacrifice both the indemnity and the territorial claim in order to obtain peace.

At the psychological moment Sir Claud Macdonald, H.M. Minister in Tokyo (it was only after the war that the Legation was raised to an Embassy) was authorized to inform the Japanese Government in confidence that there was good reason to believe that if they would drop the demand for an indemnity the Russians would make some concession on the territorial claim. This information was at once cabled to Baron Komura, the chief Japanese delegate at Portsmouth, with the result that discussions were resumed and the Russians ended by ceding the southern half of the island of Saghalin and peace followed. Half a loaf is better than no bread and to the Japanese half of this large island with its valuable fisheries and oil deposits was a most important acquisition.

At the time the Japanese were profuse in their thanks to their British ally, but it seems, alas, that all that is now forgotten. A new generation has arisen and no mention is made in Japanese history books of the fact that it is to their former ally that they owe this valuable addition to their Empire.

If enthusiasm for the alliance tended to diminish as time went on, relations remained very friendly. No official dinner party was complete without reference to the two Island Empires, common interests, drawing tighter the bonds of friendship, etc. In the last war the Japanese did all that was asked of them in ejecting the Germans from Tsingtau, convoying Australian troops and supplying our Russian ally with munitions. Relations between the Royal Navy and the Japanese Navy were all that could be desired, though it should be noted that in the Japanese army enthusiasm for the alliance, once Russia had been defeated, was never more than lukewarm. The Japanese Generals were already deeply impressed with the growing power and efficiency of the German army. They found more to admire in Germany than in other European countries. At the end of the war however after the ineffectual campaign in Eastern Siberia the army was to suffer a temporary eclipse.

Then came the Washington Conference and with it the end of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. H.M. Government vainly hoped that the Washington treaties designed to settle the affairs of the Far East would be considered in Tokyo as an adequate substitute. They never were, and though Japan unwillingly assented to the nine power treaty, she never from the first regarded it seriously. Japan is not a believer in multilateral treaties.

Pressure from the United States and Canada was mainly responsible for the termination of the alliance. Looked at solely from the point of Great Britain the ending of the alliance was unfortunate, for there was no longer any political counterweight to the friction that had already arisen from the growing economic rivalry between the two countries. The cotton goods of Osaka were everywhere replacing the products of the Lancashire Mills and the Japanese were building up with great industry and astonishing rapidity a huge export trade to all countries which had been our former markets.

Then followed the decision to establish a vast naval base at Singapore and a few years later the Naval Conference of 1930 when the Japanese Government again unwillingly agreed to a treaty, this time limiting the strength of their navy to 60 per cent. of that of the Royal Navy and of the American Navy.

The following year the army having recovered from their temporary eclipse, the wheels of expansion were again set in motion with the seizure of Manchuria in complete disregard of the Nine Power Treaty. The navy meanwhile were nursing

resentment at the obligatory limitation of their forces and with the death of Admiral Togo in 1934 the tradition of friendship with the Royal Navy may be said finally to have died.

The question arises whether H.M. Government are in part to blame for the worsening of the relations between the two countries. Unquestionably the termination of the alliance was looked upon in Japan as an act of ingratitude, almost an affront. But if the alliance had remained in being, would the history of the past twenty years have been in any way different? Would H.M. Government have been in a position to adopt a stronger attitude over the seizure of Manchuria or to have prevented the innumerable encroachments on the integrity of China, culminating in the undeclared war of 1937, which have taken place since them? I believe it is impossible to answer that question. Everyone is entitled to his own opinion and opinions will certainly differ. My own view is that the army may even have been relieved at the scrapping of the alliance. They were thenceforth free to pursue their policy of expansion in China with nothing more to fear than protests and protests if not backed by force could safely be ignored.

At the same time it is a depressing thought that our relations with Japan tend to get steadily worse and at present there is no light upon the horizon. For while we stand for the integrity of China the Japanese army are determined to dominate it and the navy is inspired by a policy of almost unlimited expansion in the Pacific, a policy which Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand inevitably consider a threat to their vital interests. It is no less a threat to the interests of the United States, and the President has made the American attitude abundantly clear.

One thing however is certain. Japan is no more to be conciliated than Germany. Our only hope of preventing war in the Pacific is to be determined and strong, so strong that Japan will decide that it is not worth the risk for her to attack us.

(Sir Robert Clive was British Ambassador to Japan 1934-1937.)

ECONOMIC STRATEGY IN EUROPE

By Hugh Quigley

ALTHOUGH it is difficult to get any real information about the European economic situation, and very little trust can be placed in any statements appearing in publications, either inside the area controlled by Germany or outside it, it is possible to sort out certain elements which together permit of some assessment.

Principal among the factors determining the economic situation are the disturbances in production and distribution caused partly by the British blockade and partly by German control of the continental market, and in addition to them, the re-alignment of continental man-power. European economy, taking it as a whole, had, since the last war and particularly since 1931, moved in the direction of agricultural self-sufficiency, intensive utilization of local resources, and the consolidation through exchange control and other methods of markets for certain basic commodities. Scandinavia, Denmark, and to some extent Belgium based a great part of their activity on the disposal of the surpluses to Great Britain and the United States. This was the case in Scandinavian timber, Norwegian electro-metallurgical and electro-chemical products, Danish butter and bacon and Belgian iron and steel, metalwork, light engineering, glass and bricks, that section of Europe having been brought to prosperity through the immense demand in the British market for public works and building materials.

In the Southern section of the Continent, Spain, Italy, Greece and to some small extent also Bulgaria and Portugal, were dependent on extra European markets for the disposal of their agricultural surplus, although it was doubtful whether, under the Franco and Mussolini régimes the creation of any kind of surplus in Spain and Italy would have been possible after a few years.

In Central Europe Germany had been almost completely successful in bringing within her control before the actual onset of war the economic and trading resources of almost every country, including Poland. Only France and Russia were able to achieve any kind of independence, but in the case of the former it was largely illusory.

Granted, therefore, the complete occupation of Europe, including the whole of Scandinavia, Spain, Italy and Turkey, by Germany, one would have expected a complete economic collapse in Scandinavia, no change in Central Europe, but a very great increase in activity in Spain and Italy, with a certain marginal prosperity in Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia, to the extent that they disposed of mineral and other resources of value for the German war effort. It would be almost impossible, even if Germany had occupied France on a friendly basis, to prevent France from falling into a state of semi-agricultural and semi-industrial paralysis.

What in effect has taken place? Germany has not, of course, occupied much more of Europe than it had already under its economic and commercial control before the war. Strangely enough, the two countries which were most closely associated with it, namely Sweden and Switzerland, have been allowed to remain independent and the reason for this is probably, not that Sweden or Switzerland could put up any really useful defence against the Germany army, but because German industrialists have such a heavy investment in both countries that they can already obtain all the benefits commensurate with those accruing from a successful military occupation, at the same time retaining intact the assets conferring those benefits. It would be an act of folly on the part of German industry to allow the military machine to destroy or weaken in any way those two outlying sources of German economic strength.

Germany also has only nominal control over Turkey, and has no really effective domination over Italy, Spain and Portugal.

Still, that does not alter the situation very much because, prior to the war, the real contribution of countries outside German control of European self-sufficiency (with the possible exception of Sweden), was on the whole negative. Granted such occupation, one would have expected fairly complete economic collapse in Scandinavia, Denmark and Belgium, but that has apparently not taken place. The German war machine has apparently been able to absorb, if anything, a greater tonnage of timber than the Scandinavian countries exported to Great Britain before the war; it has absorbed rather more foodstuffs than Holland could usefully provide, and it has been engaged on the dangerous game of clearing away as much of the agricultural production of France as could be transported. It is true that no real payment is being made for those products by Germany, but the primary producer in any country is not immediately or even closely affected by exchange difficulties.

He could continue to produce, without the necessity for utilizing very much credit and still less currency. A feature of agriculture in those Scandinavian countries and also in Central Europe is of course the self-sufficient agricultural unit whose demands on the community are either practically non-existent or, in the aggregate, not noticeably beyond the resources of the community even during a period of war starvation.

We know from the returns that Sweden's foreign trade has actually increased. We also know that Switzerland although it has imposed rationing in a certain limited way on quantities and services, is certainly not less prosperous now than it was in 1939, and it has not ceased from planning public works schemes. On the other hand, the countries which were normally supposed to benefit from a German occupation, such as Spain and Italy, are in a more dangerous economic crisis than any of the Northern European countries, and one would expect this because they are most immediately affected by the British blockade and are perhaps the principal sufferers from the blockade in Europe. Both Spain and Italy are importers of foodstuffs and their geographical position makes it necessary to effect such imports by sea rather than by land. Italian industries require to import practically everything they consume including fuel, and the developed capacities of water power of the country in its present development are incapable of making good any large proportion of the fuel used in the factories. For some years before the war, owing to capital stringency and acute credit deflation, public utility construction in Italy was virtually at a standstill.

One would expect to find, as a consequence, the beginnings of general economic collapse in those countries. This collapse would probably extend North into France from Spain and Eastwards into South-Eastern Europe. It would move last of all into Central and Southern Europe. In Central Europe, which is absolutely vital to her war effort, Germany could not afford to take any chances in matters determining the successful military and economic prosecution of the war, and so we see German organizing capacity fully at work, and the German non-military economic machine fully stretched in effecting fundamental adjustments in Central Europe.

Those adjustments, while they bear on the use of agricultural and mineral surpluses, are concentrated on three things :—

(1) The re-organization and extension of transport systems, with a view to making Southern Silesia and Poland, particularly, one of the most highly organized transport areas in the world. The

improvement and extension of the Danubian and Trans-German water systems, the creation of new trunk roads, mainly North and South of the Carpathians, and the realization of higher carrying capacity on the railways, above all in the Balkans.

(2) The revival of large public works schemes already planned before the war, but deferred. Those involve new power plants in Czechoslovakia, Austria, Yugoslavia, and certain sections of Poland. They include also the revival of large power schemes abandoned before the war in Italy, with a view to ensuring that Italian industries, already heavily concentrated in the immediate vicinity of the Alpine valleys and their openings on the plain of Lombardy, should be in a less dangerous location in Central Italy, in the vicinity of Terni for example, and the elaboration of a complete scheme for the harnessing of the River Rhone. In the last case such a scheme would cause a fundamental change in the industrial alignment of France, and lead to consolidation of what may be regarded as the German power economic block with its centre in the South of Germany and Switzerland and its main sources of energy in the upper waters of the Rhine, the tributaries of the Rhone and certain tributaries of the Danube. That power block, which is already operating in large volume, would in time take the place of the great steam plants on the Ruhr and feed directly to the new German war industries near Braunschweig, at Magdeburg, lower Silesia and Central Austria. At the present time, for example, the new power plants built on the Rhine by Swiss and German capital and combination, can export electrical energy to Germany sufficient to produce over 100,000 tons of aluminium, and as long as this situation exists and such plants are immune from bombing, so long will attacks by our Air Force on the German economic potential be not entirely effective. Again, the great electro-chemical and electro-metallurgical plants in Norway, which came to a standstill immediately after the invasion, have now been brought into production again, and there are schemes for exporting considerable quantities of energy across to Denmark and thence into Baltic Germany. This would allow a shift of industrial activity away from Kiel and Bremen to further East.

(3) The extension of the principle of self-sufficiency in industrial products from Germany into Central Europe. This would involve an immense expansion of the Central industry of Czechoslovakia, the construction of very large coal oil plants, and the regrouping and wholesale modernization of the Rumanian oil fields. It would involve also the building of substitute material factories to use the timber resources of Central Europe and it is a sufficient comment on the German preparation for war that a considerable proportion of the German heavy industry is still free to carry out those schemes.

Whether Germany was right in assuming that her superiority in the supply of war materials was so great that such a diversion could be carried out, will depend on the outcome of the Russian war. Certainly the most optimistic estimates of the American capacity to produce munitions and war equip-

ment in any appreciable quantity have not been as bad as the reality. Against that, however, must be placed the serious under-estimate by Hitler's advisers (who in this case, possibly for the first time, have shown themselves unaware of realities) not only of Russian war equipment, but, what is more important, of the Russian industrial potential.

The attention of observers in this country has been rather diverted from consideration of such ambitious industrial projects to the more obvious question of food supplies. In certain industrial products, such as fats, and textiles, Central Europe, even under the best organization, could not supply sufficient for Germany at war, and even a combination of large coal oil plants in Germany and Czechoslovakia, Poland and Austria with more intensive exploitation of Rumanian resources would not solve the problem of lubricating oils, even if temporarily it met the basic German demand for oil itself. It is only since the Russian war began that the German war machine has been consuming petrol and lubricating oil in risky quantities.

An examination of the food situation, while it shows a certain stringency in supplies available for individual members of the populations of Europe, does not prove it is unable to feed the army and the dependents of the army left behind in Germany. This war will not be won by the effectiveness of any blockade as far as it applies to agricultural products. In other words, there is no obvious reason why Europe should starve outside of Italy and Spain, and, as a result of deliberate political action, France. Belgium, Norway, Sweden will be supplied, if only to make certain that the fullest use is made of the resources of those countries. Holland and Denmark can still live on their own agricultural stocks without serious difficulty.

Where, however, difficulty might occur, would be in the cultivation of agricultural lands, particularly if there were a heavy diversion of man-power away from agriculture to the German war machine. Diversion had not taken place to any extent before the attack on Russia, but we now know that considerable Rumanian, Hungarian, Italian and Bulgarian forces have been employed in the Southern Ukraine, and that must represent a diminution of agricultural man-power. For the first time, therefore, since war began, there may be some prospects of a severe shrinkage in Central European agricultural production.

From the German point of view, the danger points in Europe are largely to be found round the Mediterranean. Gibraltar and the North African coast in particular are, from the economic and military standpoints, perhaps the most important bases

outside the Caucasus, and some part of their importance lies in the fact that absolute control of shipments from the African continent to Spain and France would almost certainly precipitate an economic crisis.

An effective war strategy on the part of the Allies would aim as rapidly as possible at the economic and industrial paralysis of Italy, Spain and France, while at the same time an attempt would be made to apply military strategy to Western and Northern Europe. A combination of those two policies would certainly lead to a shortening of the war. At the present moment there is no particular advantage, as far as Hitler is concerned, in occupying Spain, if only for the reason that the capacity of Great Britain to neutralize or destroy, through invasion or otherwise, the economic resources of Northern Africa, has not been fully tried, and as a result of the exhaustion caused by the Russian war, it is doubtful whether a German attack through Spain would be quick enough to prevent this being done.

On a general view one would say, therefore, that there are only certain parts of Europe which are verging on economic crisis, and those parts are not entirely within the range of German occupation, if we assume that Italy is still nominally independent. In the remainder of Europe, the fundamental agricultural and industrial situation is such that German industry, using its capacity for organization and control of essential equipment, could create so strong a position that no interference by the Allies would affect it critically. The position would be different, of course, if the Russians were able to stop the Hitler offensive and force the German armies back across the old Russian frontiers. In that event a combination of intensive bombing by Great Britain, combined with invasion of Western Europe would serve to supplement the Russian attack in such a way that even the German industrial machine would weaken. One cannot believe that if those changes do not occur, Britain can conquer Germany in the economic and industrial spheres.

If one assumes that the Allies will be successful, one must look to the position which may result after the war. We know that certain of the Allied governments are already making extensive preparations for the maintenance of the populations of their countries in the event of a German retreat, but the feeding of the European population, even after a protracted war, would not be so difficult as it was in 1918-19. There are immense agricultural surpluses available outside Europe and

existing even in certain parts inside Europe, and there will be some pressure on extra European neutral countries to dispose of those surpluses if only to avoid a series of agrarian crises.

The second phase, namely the restoration of normal economic activity, if one part of it involves the development of very large public works in order to relieve unemployment, will be rendered extraordinarily difficult through the very action of Germany at the present time. The public works which can be carried out by a state, the modernization and expansion of industry producing capital goods, cover at best only a limited range, and the very exigencies of war have compelled Germany to carry out a considerable proportion of those public works in advance. It may be actually necessary to carry out a certain measure of deflation of industrial and public works equipment. This possibility may easily arise in countries like Czechoslovakia, Austria and of course Germany. It may be found in so-called neutral countries, like Sweden and Switzerland. We have seen from our own experience that the industrial machine, if within industry we include the public services, can be so extensive and so widely scattered that only occupation by an army could effect the necessary destruction.

There is a third phase, which may easily occur, and it may be bound up with such things as the permanent loss of export trade by European countries, including Great Britain. The long-term effect of American policy, for example, must be to transfer to American industry the more valuable markets of the world, and one cannot see how that transfer can be avoided. If the price of winning the war means in effect that Europe must sacrifice its export trade to America, then it must be done, because there is no question about ultimate advantage. The question is not whether British industry, for example, can get back its export position as it was before the war either against or in combination with the United States or Germany, but whether the course of world production and world trade is to be determined by a collection of countries dominated by Germany or the United States. The part played by Great Britain, no matter how optimistically we may regard the situation, has ceased to be of fundamental importance.

When the various Governments in power since 1931 were carrying out a policy of appeasement vis-à-vis Germany and German industry, they were not only sacrificing the political future of Great Britain; they were making quite certain that even in the event of a successful war, British industry could not recover its normal position or maintain its power to support

the economic fabric of the British Empire. Now, through the very occupation of European countries, the German industrial machine has secured control for German industry of the European market, and it is doubtful whether the war can upset that control unless deliberate policy by the allies aims at eliminating it. We know, from bitter experience, that the last war not only did not weaken the German control of the European market; it actually strengthened it.

There are other considerations which occur to the mind, but they do not influence the main conclusion, which is that the problems caused by the war in European economy are already of such a difficult and urgent character that they must be faced, but the examination of those problems must be conducted in a spirit of realism accompanied by an acute appreciation of fact. Admittedly, it is difficult in a time of hostilities to achieve anything like an objective survey, and there is always a tendency to avoid contemplation of disagreeable reality as far as it is possible to do so. That has been one of the weaknesses of our political and economic policy after the last war, and it threatens to continue throughout and after this war.

It may be sufficient for the purposes of German industries that in ruining themselves they may be ruining Great Britain. Our capacity for economic and industrial recovery was shown after the last war to be inferior to that of Germany. Assuming that the United States plays no effective part, the long-term economic changes that have been indicated will not take place and the emergence of German industry as a successful competitor against British industry from a Europe entirely ruined is possible. Certainly our approach to the subject, as far as present indications go, is not one to inspire confidence either in our capacity or our judgment. Our handling of Europe is bound up with our handling of our own industries, and of the man power required for those industries, and it is quite impossible to see any policy relating to man power in this country which is anything more enlightened than a mere expansion of the British army and a contraction of British industrial production. We are still involved in the fallacy that it is possible to segregate civilian from war industries, expand the latter, contract the former and achieve a maximum war production. So far, the indications are that we are in danger of achieving a minimum of both.

DESIGN FOR VICTORY

By Emanuel Shinwell, M.P.

WHERE do we stand in this the third year of war? Is the victory plan unmistakably revealing itself in our military, production and political policies?

Frankness alone will serve us. There must be no dodging of uncomfortable facts, no whipping-up of spurious optimism, and none of the fatalistic nonsense of those who prate about "winning the last battle," as though it were inevitable, and completely independent of previous blunders and disasters.

There will be no drifting to victory. The Nazi outlaws have shewn the world what they mean by total war. Bludgeoned Europe is the evidence of the terrible efficiency of a fighting machine unequalled in world history, and the main purpose of this machine is to smash the British Commonwealth out of existence.

In face of this grim challenge there should be little need to urge for a war policy throbbing with energy, swift in its execution, and charged with a confidence well-founded on complete administrative efficiency.

It should also be unnecessary to stir up certain sections of our people to a proper degree of war-consciousness, to hold before them the torch of self-sacrifice, so that they may see more clearly the path where duty lies.

The people of Russia are giving the world a tremendous illustration of what it means to grapple with the diabolical power and limitless bestiality of the Nazis. Great tracts of Soviet territory have been overrun, priceless industrial plant and equipment have been destroyed. Indescribable acts of cruelty and sadistic violence have been committed against men, women and children, whose only crime is that they have chosen to defend their homeland against murderous marauders. The grim monument of self-sacrifice further reveals its ghastly and colossal dimensions with Stalin's recent statement of Russian war casualties: 350,000 men killed, 378,000 missing, and 1,020,000 wounded.

Truly, the resistance of our Ally is an epic chapter of the human story. It is one of the greatest defences ever put up for liberty. The saving of Moscow is the saving of London, of

New York, and every other city in the world that is free from the blighting presence of Nazi barbarity.

Clearly, when something of the extent of Soviet courage and suffering is realized, there can be no doubt as to what is the paramount duty of this country: it is to help our Ally without stint, and in a manner that does not offer the slightest suggestion of political prejudice.

How can we do this effectively? Unfortunately, we have to face the lamentable fact that our output of the implements of war is hardly in keeping with practically two centuries of intense industrial and manufacturing practice.

Russia is mainly an agricultural country. Her vigorous application to problems of industrialization, following generations of Tzarist neglect, belongs to our own day. Yet this nation has staggered the world with the volume, variety and efficiency of her war output.

Lord Beaverbrook, following his Moscow conversations with Stalin, has told us that the Government will go out to supply the things of which Russia stands so urgently in need. Other Ministers have been equally emphatic in their pledges of full British support. No doubt, these declarations are sincere. Indeed, the flow of war material, tanks and the rest, has already attained considerable volume. It is pertinent to ask, however, whether still more cannot be done.

Without particularizing, it can be said with justification that the military leadership of this country in the present war has not been overburdened with genius or efficiency. We have had sneering references to "amateur strategists," although the pronouncements, prophecies and accomplishments of certain professional strategists would suggest that they themselves are not very far removed from the amateur status.

Let us ask ourselves these questions. Is there no possible field of action in the long coastal stretch from Norway to Spain? Expeditions, sporadic raids, guerrilla warfare—can we do nothing in any of these directions? Has the possibility of on attack on Southern Italy or in the Adriatic been properly assessed? The Nazis took the Channel Islands from us with an ease that calls for a stunning reply that might be given in the Mediterranean or elsewhere. But in any projected offensive action there must be none of the gross lack of war essentials that made France, Narvik, Greece and Crete infernos for the finest fighting men in the world.

It is true that the risks, difficulties and losses inherent in any comprehensive attack on the French coast would be very great.

We have to bear in mind the certainty of grievous casualties, and immense havoc among such shipping as we have available for landing purposes.

If our military policy is to be a static one, the sitting behind an "Empire Maginot Line," while the list of butchered and subjugated nations grows to yet more horrifying dimensions; if our military resources are to be devoted principally to the defence of Great Britain, North Africa, Suez, Iran, Syria, India and elsewhere, what length can we place to a war, now in its third year, in which the initiative has been overwhelmingly with the enemy?

This defensive strategy has its attractions. But do not let us forget that we cannot win this war until we have hammered hell out of the Nazi military machine. Further, we can rest assured, if Hitler is able to establish a line in Russia that he can hold with a portion of his present attacking forces, he will use the coming winter in feverish and stupendous preparation for the annihilation of this country. Practically the whole of continental Europe is his workshop, and its population his slaves.

These considerations are advanced in no spirit of fear for the future. On the contrary, I am of opinion that with the proper organization and employment of our vast resources, plus the invaluable and greatly-increasing aid of the United States, we can win. But the conditions of success are the generation of a military enterprise and efficiency, the infusion of an almost demoniac energy into our war production effort that, so far, has not been attained.

This all-important business of production has been responsible for much criticism of Government direction. In the House of Commons debates and questions have laid bare flaws in our industrial organization that ought not to exist.

There have been dislocations, misdirection and palpable confusion to which Parliamentary critics, in the national interest, have drawn attention.

In the main the critics have been completely justified, although they have not always been understood. Ministerial irritation, however slight, cannot cancel out healthy and constructive advice. If it were to do so, then the whole concept of Parliament as the free debating assembly and executive of the nation would cease to have any meaning.

In our long parliamentary history there has never yet been a Government, so complete in its efficiency, that it stood in no need of advice and suggestions from outside. The present Administration, burdened as it is with colossal responsibilities,

is as fallible as most of its predecessors. Therefore, criticism, inspired by the supreme objective of winning the war, is necessary: it is, in fact, a fundamental public duty.

The Nazis, with their pathetic Italian camp followers, have paralysed the processes of normal civilization with the idea and practice of total war, an all-in belligerency shorn of the slightest respect for common humanity and decency.

To meet this challenge from the dark criminal forces of the abyss everyone of us must be put to the work we can best accomplish in the interest of national salvation.

The Government has shewn some hesitancy in introducing the compulsory principle into our productive effort. Appeals for service have not produced the results they ought to have done; many people, in fact, have suffered but trivial interference with their pre-war mode of living.

We know what the men of the Fighting Services and the Merchant Navy are doing. We are also gratefully aware of the self-sacrifice and public spirit of the personnel of the Civil Defence Services. But what of the comfortable individuals who spend their time avoiding the responsibilities of citizenship, using precious petrol for pleasure-seeking, including regular attendance at race-meetings, and who are able to defy the ration system because of their ability to patronize expensive restaurants and hotels?

Surely, at this critical hour in our country's history every evidence of selfish excess should be rigorously suppressed. We simply cannot afford hangers-on. It is idle to talk of fighting for democracy, if we allow certain people to be unashamedly undemocratic.

The sailor, the soldier, the airman and their dependents are not by any means the subjects of State generosity. Indeed, much more will be heard in the House of Commons on this subject.

Old age pensioners will go hungry and cold during the winter; thousands of aging people—small shopkeepers, boarding-house proprietors and the rest—will face a grim and unsympathetic future. Only those who are in touch with it fully appreciate the severity of the economic distress that has enveloped many people who could do nothing in their own defence.

There is an Act of Parliament which empowers the Government to mould the industrial and social life of this country as it pleases. If our production effort is not humming at maximum power, or if certain sections of the community are being

called upon to bear an unequal burden of economic hardship, then the responsibility lies with the Government.

It is important to remember that our failure to establish something like an equalitarian mode of living, to banish every evidence of preferential treatment for business interests or for individuals is noted outside our own boundaries.

Isolationist and anti-British agitation in the United States is quick to profit by any fact that appears to discount our enthusiasm for democracy. We can best dispel this type of propaganda by being completely democratic.

In these critical times no one is more anxious than I am to preserve national unity. With the enemy at the gate it would be madness to indulge in futile internecine political squabbles. But this does not mean that we must accord automatic endorsement of every act of the Government, and sit in mute acceptance of every ministerial statement.

If a collection were made of the week-end orations of certain members of the Government, they would provide an interesting study. Indeed, if some of the pronouncements had had even a distant connection with the actual facts of the war situation, we should now have our preparations for the celebration of victory well in hand.

The Prime Minister has served his country well. Despised and rejected by certain influential wire-pullers in the Party of which, paradoxically enough, he is now the leader, he inherited from Chamberlain a legacy of misgovernment and administrative futility that a lesser man would have feared to accept.

Generations to come will read with a sense of shame of the Franco-British betrayal of Czechoslovakia, of British Ministers answering the Hitlerian whip, and of their obsequious politeness to the bellowing puppet Cæsar who has plunged Italy into ruin and despair. The same readers will be staggered by the terrible incompetence of the Chamberlain Government as revealed in the gross mismanagement and lack of equipment of the British expedition to Norway.

For more than a year the Prime Minister has grappled with enormous tasks. He is no longer a young man, yet he displays an energy that would be remarkable in anyone twenty years his junior. He still has the confidence and support of the great majority of the people; they believe in his ability to pull us through the greatest crisis in our long history. They do not believe that the Government as a whole could not be improved.

Every intelligent observer knows that the traditional see-saw of peace-time politics has gone for ever. In the new world, to

which we must direct great efforts of social and economic reconstruction, there will be no place for legislative dallying; the public patience will not tolerate it. Certain Ministers would be well advised to keep in closer touch with what many people are thinking and saying. The Prime Minister himself, with his lengthy and unrivalled political experience, should know that he cannot afford to carry ministerial "passengers." There must be changes in the Government, and they must be made soon.

It will come as a surprise to certain political Rip Van Winkles to be told that the present-day trend of social and economic thinking is towards the Left. Times of great national crisis and danger invariably give rise to new ideas and convictions. The present is no exception to this order of things. The vast majority of the ordinary people of this country can see no future for orthodox Conservatism.

If the Prime Minister wishes to keep pace with the gathering momentum of progressive or radical thought, not to speak of the millions who view society through the glasses of co-operative Socialism, he will take immediate steps to bring his Administration more closely in touch with these ideas.

Protestations about reconstruction of our national life at some distant date will not do. The people of this country are ready for change now. A wise Government will see that their aspirations are correctly interpreted.

A new consciousness of their real position in our communal life has been strongly developed among large sections of the working classes by the stern realities of war. The man who can keep essential services going—transport, lighting and water supplies—following the ravages of air-raids, now knows that he is, for example, infinitely more important to our everyday life than the smug interest, rent and dividend collector, who is able to slink away to places of comparative safety, but who still thinks that he is an essential part of the community.

To most unprejudiced people it is now plain that the effect of the Russian resistance to Nazi aggression on political thinking in this country is very great. Many others who formerly bracketed Communism with the more conspicuous social ills, are now regarding the Russian system with a tolerance and interest in strong contrast to their pre-war contemptuous dismissal of the tenets of Lenin.

Nothing can prevent the Soviet Union from playing a highly important part in the future of the world. They have earned the right to rank equally with any other nation, not excepting this country or the United States.

This fact, of course, will not be pleasing to certain comfortable members of the more exclusive clubs, nor to the barrack-square-minded military " experts " who prophesied a Russian military collapse within a month of the commencement of the war with the Nazis.

If there are still in Government circles those who are constitutionally unable to swallow the Russian pill, those who are not over-excited or even mildly enthusiastic at the amazing demonstration of the military capacity and heroism of our Ally, then the sooner they are dispensed with the better. We cannot afford to entrust any administrative task to those who frown heavily at the mere mention of an economic as well as a political democracy for this country.

The sacrifices now being made by the great bulk of our people entitle them to something more than dictates emanating from reactionary minds. The times are too serious to allow of the dull performances of moss-grown mediocrity.

I demand, therefore, and I am not by any means alone in this, that the Government shall be overhauled, that it shall be given a more radical and progressive complexion, and that it shall bear a closer affinity to the strong political currents of these times.

The House of Commons has a special duty in this matter, for it is in the national debating chamber that the administrative frailties of certain of the Government Front-Benchers can be most ruthlessly and effectively exposed.

Of course, the critics will be unpopular. They will be, as indeed they already have been, accused of impeding the working of the Government machine, of promoting sectional and individual interests, and of failing to appreciate the enormous burdens that now rest on the shoulders of Ministers.

If at any time these allegations should be true, then the critic cannot escape condemnation. But if criticism is advanced with the purposes of securing a vigorous and efficient war policy, and promoting a better and less individualistic mode of living for our people, then it stands justified.

We are all in this war. None of us knows how long we will be free from a ghastly visitation of death, injury and ruin. Tens of thousands of our people have already suffered grievously; no man can estimate the gigantic volume of human misery.

The Prime Minister has been presented with one of the great opportunities of history. With a public backing which has few parallels, he can reorganize the life of the nation in such a

manner as to bring it more into line with our democratic protestations.

The things to be done are obvious. The whole power and influence of the great interests—land, finance, coal, transport and the rest—must be made the instruments of the public well-being. The men must be found who can ensure this.

The ordinary people of this country are ringed around with compulsory service of various kinds. They are subject to unescapable regulations and orders. With great fortitude they are submitting themselves to the limitations and strain of a war economy. Their tenacity and self-sacrifice will take us through to victory.

Why, then, should we not have a reorganized Government that will use existing statutory powers to liquidate long-standing privilege and financial power in the interest of the community as a whole?

The past political history of certain members of the Government does not suggest that they would be enthusiastic in the carrying out of such a revolutionary economic change. They want little or no interference with the old order of things, no tampering with a system that since the Industrial Revolution has intensified its profit-squeezing capacity to the detriment of the workers who, normally, have to compete among themselves for the opportunity of making the profits possible.

I am not now raising issues of party politics. But I am demanding that the Government shall face certain facts, that it shall realize that out of the sufferings of war there must come a new concept of a just and ordered communal life.

Promises of post-war action are not enough. Reconstruction of our economic system can begin now, if there is the will to do it. I am as aware as most of the great responsibilities resting on the Prime Minister. If, as some people think, he is assuming too many administrative tasks, then let him find men who will lighten considerably his weight of strategic and domestic policy.

In the coming year the Nazis will concentrate on our total destruction. Our fighting machine must be tuned-up to its greatest possible efficiency; our domestic policy must be such as to convince the people that they are indeed fighting for democracy.

The Prime Minister, with a Government team that commands the public confidence, can ensure these things. But he must begin *now*.

BRITISH BROADCASTING IN WAR-TIME

By W. E. Williams

ANY appraisal of war-time broadcasting in this country is liable to confuse the responsibility of the B.B.C. with the responsibility of the Government. The collaboration between Whitehall and the B.B.C. Board of Governors, is, no doubt, often ardent and harmonious; at other times it is perhaps as reluctant as that of an occupied country with its conqueror. It is not possible, at every turn of such a summary article as this, to separate these two responsibilities for war-time broadcasting in this country, even if one could always be sure of the dividing line between them on any particular issue. So, in considering the achievements or the failures of B.B.C. war-time programmes, it is well to keep constantly in mind the fact that the Corporation is not necessarily or solely responsible for what the listener hears.

I. The War-Time Transformation

The background against which we must consider war-time broadcasting is one of constant growth, change and improvization. First there have been the physical difficulties and complications, such as the limitation, for security reasons, of the number of wave-lengths, the evacuation of many B.B.C. branches, " enemy interference " and the like. These physical factors have, in fact, because they were merely physical, proved the least intractable; they have demanded for their solution infinite patience, ingenuity and fortitude, but in these qualities the engineers, administrators and producers of the B.B.C. have been well-endowed.

More difficult to cope with has been the process of rapid expansion enforced on the B.B.C. Almost overnight the beanstalk has blossomed into a polyglot service of programmes radiating all over the earth. Two years ago the B.B.C. broadcast regularly in nine different languages; to-day it uses 39. Services which were embryonic when the war began, such as the Arabic programme, had suddenly to bear a heavy responsibility for speaking Britain's case; and one after another Foreign Language services had to be organized to share in the propaganda counter-offensive against enemy transmissions.

Moreover, the war made it necessary for the B.B.C. not only to transmit on an unprecedented scale but also to listen to foreign broadcasts on a similar scale. The Monitoring Service —which Ivor Brown has neatly described as "the Ear of Britain listening to the Voices of the World"—is another of those B.B.C. Departments which, once a nucleus, have now become a battalion. The technical problems of such services, exacting as they were, could more easily be adjusted than the administrative problems caused by the rapid mobilization of a staff which grew by thousands in a very short time.

B.B.C. administrative machinery, always over-elaborate, often assumed a Heath Robinson aspect in the early stages of this massive expansion and daily improvization. Just as the plumber in a crisis shouts for another spanner, so there was at Broadcasting House a habit of crying-out for another Co-ordinator when the machine began to creak. This inclination to multiply co-ordinating cogs, especially in the upper sections of the structure, was often accompanied by a neglect to provide a sufficient number of working-parts lower down, and many of the lesser officials of the Corporation continue to suffer an unreasonable burden of overwork. The staff of the B.B.C. has swollen in two years from 2,000 to 10,000, a rate of absorption which was bound to inflict administrative colic upon the Corporation. These diseases of expansion are not, of course, peculiar to the B.B.C.; they affect many other war-time organizations, notably the Ministries and the Services; but they are liable to be unusually troublesome to an organization which has to deal with material so fragile and perishable as news and propaganda.

II. The Propaganda Motive

Even the difficulties so far enumerated, are, however, not the most exacting which the B.B.C. has had to resolve. From being its own master the B.B.C. has suddenly been put at the beck and call of a legion of different propaganda purposes. First there has been the duty, imposed all-the-clock-round on the Corporation, of transmitting in many languages news-bulletins and propaganda-material to almost every foreign country, allied, enemy-occupied, and neutral. Not only has the B.B.C. had to adapt and adjust itself to the "official" requirement of such a service but it has had, at the same time, to cope with minor demands, of a similar kind, from the host of Government departments concerned with the conduct of the war. Every Whitehall bureau has clamoured for time on the air to

inform, exhort or reprimand the ignorant and recalcitrant citizen. The multitudinous campaigns initiated or administered by a dozen Ministries have all included a wireless-offensive, some of which (like War Savings) have kept up their pressure without a week's remission. Thus, with its transmission-time in the Home Services seriously cut down, compared with the transmission-times available in the good old days of Regional Programmes, the B.B.C. has had to assimilate this constant and considerable propaganda and publicity motive in its programmes.

One can trace the growth and persistence of this motive in the steady increase of such programmes as "Under Your Tin Hat," "Women at War." One department of state succeeds in winning from the B.B.C. programme-time for its particular interest and advocacy; and in next to no time several other Government departments are agitating for a similar opportunity. The growth of this sort of programme need not be regarded, by any means, as a debit to broadcasting. All these exhortations to spend less, plant more, eat adventurously, leave home with the A.T.S., enrol in this and subscribe to that are to some extent an overdue lesson to the British public in the elements of citizenship; and it is to be hoped that, when peace comes, a more controlled and more subtle effort will be made to continue this elementary form of civic education. In war-time these efforts tend to be unrelated, unskilful and half-hearted.

The effect of this propaganda-pressure has been, on the whole, to weaken the quality of much of the B.B.C. output. Despite most tactful representation the B.B.C. cannot always manage to persuade this Minister or that to keep away from the microphone and leave his "case" to be transmitted by a man of less celebrity but more competence at the game. Hence the incredibly tedious and unskilful ministerial broadcasts and Front Bench blatherings which have occupied too much of the best hours of broadcasting since the war began. Not only are these misfits so often unsuited by nature for the difficult task of broadcasting, but only too often they are afflicted with an arrogance which makes them underrate the technique of broadcasting and causes them to reject the proposal that they should submit themselves, both in script-writing and rehearsal, to the expert wisdom of the B.B.C. production-staff.

The fact remains, therefore, that, having been forced to find time for one wireless propaganda campaign after another, the B.B.C. has too little a voice in drafting the material and putting it across. The first process is left usually in the hands of some

Director of Public Relations, not all of whom have even a rudimentary idea of the right idiom for broadcasting; and the second process is too often entrusted to a Minister who, on his way to the studio, deigns to run through the script in the taxi, and who, on arrival at the microphone, delivers the dope in that ponderous fashion which most of his kind use in addressing their constituents or the House of Commons.

In peace-time the B.B.C. would not have to cope with this interminable motive of home-propaganda; nor would it in peace-time have to find room on the air for this procession of Ministerial bores and mumblers. Whenever the listening public is disposed to make sardonic comments upon these official pronouncements it is worth remarking that, as a rule, they are wished upon a reluctant B.B.C. And the public will continue to be so afflicted until the Corporation is given the power to put its foot down on this question. No one disputes the need for these official pronouncements, but there should be reserved to the B.B.C. the right to edit a script or reject a speaker so as to ensure that the propaganda is effective and popular. As things are they have to surrender not only the right of policy-making but also the right of maintaining the standards of broadcast-speech. It is inevitable in war-time that broadcasting must abandon many of the things it might prefer to do in order to do the chores of information-and-exhortation for innumerable departments of State. But if the B.B.C. had been strong enough to insist that, *as producer*, its decision was final, then our propaganda and information output might have been of far higher quality than it is. As things are the law of diminishing returns results in less and less attention being paid by the ordinary citizen to those multitudinous directions, reminders and recapitulations. If the B.B.C. had a free hand in assembling and producing this mass of material, it might well be able not only to eliminate repetition, boredom and amateurishness in this home-front propaganda, but also to throw it into significent relief by some such device as that suggested by a recent Mass Observation Report:—

> There might be, at nine o'clock every Sunday night, a regular broadcast by the Minister of Information, giving the whole picture of the war, as he and the Cabinet see it; followed up by definite instructions for the coming week, but few, clear and co-ordinated. Every good citizen would be expected to listen to this broadcast, which would also be turned on in all public places, factories, etc., as the most important single event of the week.*

**Change.* No. 2 Bulletin of the Advertising Service Guild: prepared by Mass Observation, November, 1941.

III. Cutting Down Criticism

We come next, in this summary of the disabilities which affect British broadcasting in war-time, to one which is of fundamental gravity: the cutting-down of the normal ration of popular criticism. One of the most admirable virtues of the B.B.C. has been its deliberate policy of promoting intelligent discussion, and in pre-war days it managed to secure a fair latitude even in matters of political controversy. It is true that the occasions on which political themes were discussed tended to be severely formal: a neat triangular forum representing the set opinion of the predominant parties. Yet they were a beginning of what might have become a very important method of political education; and they certainly enabled public opinion to find a voice for many of its political grievances and deviations. To-day that voice is sadly diminished on the air. There are, it is true, occasions on which minor differences are given a little ventilation—usually in the course of a Food Forum discussion, but no occasion is provided for any exchange of public opinion on the conduct of the war or similar major matters of policy. While, for instance, a Minister may assert on the air that to "Strike Now in the West" would be folly, no one else, even of equal eminence and authority is allowed to express a contrary proposition. It is not the business of such an article as this to argue the rights and wrongs of such a prohibition. It is, indeed, a policy which, dictated by security considerations, is also probably endorsed by national sentiment as a whole. Nevertheless, it must be maintained that this denial of political discussion in war-time broadcasting reduces the ozone in the air and makes many listeners complain that they find less exhilaration than they used to in the spoken word. In its secondary programmes, such as those for Group Listening, the B.B.C. does its level best to retain the principle of balanced controversy, yet there remains among many of the B.B.C's. thoughtful listeners this sense that the primary issues of the day no longer secure wireless ventilation.

One consequence of the enforced allotment of programme-time to official propaganda of one sort and another is a growing monotony of production methods. Feature programmes have increased in number yet decreased in resourcefulness and ingenuity. They have become set exercises on a few well-worn formulæ. One of the most over-worked, for example, is the industrial-effort pattern, in which, to the sound of hammers or circular saws, the B.B.C. everlastingly interviews an endless army of war-workers. There is the war-in-the-air motive, the

Civil-Defence motive, the epic-of-the-sea motive, all being worked out in a formula which seems to become more and more stereotyped with each month of the war.

IV. Presenting the News

A fair test of the progress and power of broadcasting in war-time is its presentation of the news. On this score there is one claim which the B.B.C. has never made yet which it has certainly established—and that is a reputation for accuracy which is neither exceeded nor even equalled by the Press as a whole. B.B.C. bulletins never succumb to the temptation to splash a sensational rumour; the percentage of "adulteration" in their reports is microscopic. This is one reason why, far beyond the confines of this country, they are accepted as the nearest to the truth a listener can hope to get. In its presentation of the news the B.B.C. is austere, a virtue which contributes considerably to the sense of veracity its bulletins produce. The headlines which precede the bulletins are modest and restrained, the anecdotes and other garnishings are not interlarded with the news, as they are in the newspapers, but reserved for post-script presentation. And, finally, despite occasional carpings from people who want to kill the bearer of bad tidings, the bulletins are wisely read in bold, animated but untendentious voices by the B.B.C's. little team of news-readers. On the credit side of its news service the B.B.C. can claim accuracy, sobriety, brevity and good delivery. These qualities they achieve, moreover, in circumstances more harassing even than those which afflict Fleet Street. For inasmuch as the words winged from Broadcasting House find their way instantly to enemy ears they have to be more thoroughly sifted than those which, in the form of newspapers, only get to the enemy, by circuitous neutral routes, after many days.

And on the debit side of the News, what is there when the carpings have been sifted away? An occasional reticence? An occasional delay in admitting losses which the enemy has jubilantly announced? These deficiencies certainly occur, but when they do it is censorship and not the News staff which is responsible. Moreover, they occur equally in the newspapers and for the same reason. Yet the paradox persists that not only the public but the press itself is quicker to censure the B.B.C. than the newspapers for this sort of reticence. The only serious item to go on the debit side is a not infrequent lapse of proportion in sub-editing. On a day when Russia is fighting a massive and bloody battle it is possible to hear in the British

news an item about a raid over France in which " a gasholder and a petrol waggon were set on fire." Similar trivialities, and worse, occur of course in the newspapers, but in print they seem less irrelevant than when spoken out loud by Alvar Lidell.

V. Continuity of Pre-War Policy

When one considers, especially in relation to its restricted wavelengths, the amount of " war-material " the B.B.C. has to carry these days, it is remarkable that so much of the B.B.C's. pre-war policy is still revealed in the programmes. That continuity of policy, which must impose innumerable problems on the programme-planning authorities, deserves far more recognition than it usually gets. Such special interests as School Broadcasting survive unimpaired, largely no doubt because they can still be served in the " slack hours " of morning and early afternoon. But it is a notable fact that by mid-October of this year the number of schools taking the B.B.C. service had risen, in England and Wales, to the record figure of 10,000. What is more notable is that the B.B.C. has shown its determination to serve such minority-interests as those which listen mainly to chamber-music, " serious " talks and discussion, poetry-readings and classical plays. The wild assertion that the enemy show a greater concern than we do to provide the serious pleasures of broadcasting in war time will not stand up to the reports of the monitoring services.*

In some ways the B.B.C. has managed to increase its pre-war efforts in popular education. Even though we are marooned on our embattled isle we have closer wireless contact than ever before with international affairs. The exchange of notable wireless talks between this country and the U.S.A., for example, is giving many millions of citizens (in both countries) a fuller knowledge of each other than they ever sought or secured before the war. The wireless cordon round the Soviet Union has been withdrawn and after many years of ignorance we begin to learn something of that resolute race whose destiny is now linked again with that of the democracies. Although the cynic may declare that it comes perilously late, the fact remains that broadcasting is to-day giving the British a fuller, if elementary, education in International Affairs than it ever had before. And although the necessities of propaganda have been, more than anything else, the cause of our services in 39 languages, yet there has been laid down in our Overseas Ser-

e.g. See an accurate but ill-tempered article " Germany Calling " by Ralph Hill in *Radio Times*, October 31, 1941.

vices a method of projecting Britain which we shall doubtless retain and develop after the war. The same hope may be expressed particularly of the Empire Service which has shown a way whereby the partners in the Commonwealth can develop a knowledge as well as a vague sentiment about each other.

One staple element of the B.B.C's. pre-war policy was the Regional Programme, an element which seemed doomed from the moment when the Regional wavelengths had to be abandoned. The B.B.C. itself seemed to put the seal on this doom by deciding to use its only alternative " home " wavelength for a Forces Programme. Yet, as the war has gone on, the B.B.C. has managed in a dozen thoughtful and sometimes ingenious ways, to retain the valuable Regional element. Feature programmes have reminded Wiltshire of Yorkshire ways and Yorkshire voices. South Wales has spoken (and sung) to the London listener, and Scotland (as usual) has managed to get more than its share. Of many of these devices, one of the neatest has been the itinerary of that radio character called Billy Welcome, the Yorkshire lad who makes his affable and observant progress from Lands End to John o' Groats and who proves as socially-conscious as any Arthur Young and a sight more amusing.

Why the Forces Programme continues it is difficult to see. The conditions which may have justified its existence when the B.E.F. was in France have vanished. If there is one privation more than another which afflicts every soldier, on some level and in some degree, it is the sense of separation from his old life. He wants reminders of that life rather than an emphasis of the new sense of separation from it. His sentiment is against a " Forces Programme," particularly as there is little in that programme nowadays which seems meant more for a soldier than for a munition-worker or a land-girl. The soldier, sailor and airman would be well content with the Home Service programme, better pleased with it on the whole than the inferior product, in all departments, of the forces programme. If the B.B.C. has only two wave-lengths for its British programmes, it seems a rash prodigality to use them in the present way. Better pairs would surely be " London " and " Regional," or even " Serious " and " Profane."

VI. On Balance

On any objective consideration of the facts of its work in war-time, the B.B.C. comes out with credit. Its difficulties have been extensive and diverse. Yet in the tug-of-war for the

control of its activities it has never shown signs of more than a temporary strain. It has no doubt often slipped up, and sometimes let daring and adventurous opportunities go by. On the other hand, it has committed far fewer *gaffes* and errors of judgment than Fleet Street, Whitehall and the Ministry of Information. It may be said that the B.B.C. lacks initiative and colour in its manner and its method. True, it usually wears a sober suit, but that is undoubtedly the preference of the solid mass of British licence-holders. It is all very well to point to the full-blooded devices of M. Lozovsky in his Moscow talks and news, but Britain does not like more than a small and intermittent dose of the lurid in its broadcasting. So long as it gets a dollop of Seaman Frank or Quentin Reynolds now and again it gets about as much of that sort of stimulant as it wants. And it has a habit of reaching satiety overnight.

British broadcasting to-day still suffers from confusions of policy; it works through a clumsy and top-heavy machine; it loses its balance, very often, in matters of production—witness this current craze for elaborate expensive Feature Programmes which manage in the end to say less than a talk and to say it rather distractingly. Yet for all this, and much more, which must be said about the imperfections of the B.B.C., the fact remains that on every single level the B.B.C. keeps its audience and maintains the standard of its pre-war years. And that achievement, in the circumstances of these times, is a more considerable one than we are inclined to think when some reputed comic has proved a bore or when we missed the Mozart because we forgot to look at the clock.

LONDON RESPLENDENT

By A. E. Richardson

IN these strange times, when so many regret the past, it is permissible to look forward with confidence to the era of reconstruction. We are concerned with the aspect of our cities in the future, particularly those which have suffered most. The prospect quite naturally holds some brilliant visions for every point of view. For example the London of fifty years hence will be different in every way from the London fifty years ago. And as it is reasonable to expect that most English towns will follow the example set by it, consideration of London's future must take priority. Despite hope for the future there is little to be gained by minimizing the extent of the disaster which has swept so much of history into the dust. By comparison the Great Fire of 1666 was less terrific.

In this country and in America, where antiquity has been, and is still reverenced, the losses will be felt most sorely. In time the incidents will assume a legendary importance, because of the pain and the sense of loss. We shall speak of the *Blitz* of September, 1940, as our forebears spoke of the Plague year, and we shall measure our future attainments in architecture by the prowess of those whose duty it will be to organize the remodelling of our streets. As a nation we are becoming architecturally minded. There is a wiser direction presaged by the Government in matters of Civics. The public is appreciative of buildings and works of art which are simple and easy to understand. It would therefore be wise to expect neither too much nor too little. But we must oppose all attempts to disturb the inherent charm of London, and set our faces resolutely against the adventitious and the uncouth. In particular the devisers of new buildings must discard those spectacles of curious focus which distort their projects. Up to now architects have been cudgelling one another. Some have placed science on a pedestal, others have followed the vagaries of Continental fashions, yet others have lapsed into mediocrity. It is notorious that so few have realized the need for an ideal in the art they profess.

As we are facing up to realities, we are finding that the fault inheres not so much in the lack of public taste, but in the absence of direction and cultured patronage. Under such circumstances it is clear that the widest view-point is needed, but the chief professional qualification is that a real architect should be an artist.

Goethe once said:

> As a poet I am a polytheist, as a naturalist, a pantheist, as a moral man, a deist, and in order to express my mind, I need all these forms.

From such reasonings, as those stated, can be deducted the fact that we need to break down the barriers of idle controversy and begin again with humility.

There is no spectacle in the world finer than the strange agglomeration of buildings we call London. Here is a vast work without equal on the earth; a city which seems to present the soul of the Empire at a glance. But the truth lies deeper, for the character of the English people, their attitude to life, their civic pride, belongs to centuries of spiritual emotion and collective discipline. How else can we explain the genius of London?

While opinion on the inheritance of London does not vary, it is only natural that ideas on replanning should diverge. This is not unexpected; the problem is immense, the avenues of approach to a reasonable solution are few. It is, therefore, of timely interest to review what has been done so far to prepare for post war conditions. The creation of a Ministry of Works and Buildings was the Government's first step for the organization of the building industry to meet emergencies. This measure was wise, just and logical. It ensured the proper rationing of materials, determined the priority of war building, and made full use of specialized professional advice.

The Corporation of the City of London, and the London County Council have conjointly prepared statistics for remodelling the damaged centres. The foremost authority on town planning has been engaged to advise. There can be no complaint of the measures in hand, or of the comprehensive scope of the undertakings. Similar schemes, equally broad and sympathetic, have been initiated in other great cities and towns. Such is the use which has been made of public departments to prepare ground work for new civic developments. In the case of London's future, one thing only is lacking, a really imaginative architectural plan which could provide suggestions without manufacturing cobweb distinctions.

Thanks to the inspiration of the President, supported by the talent of the architect members of the Royal Academy, a plan for Metropolitan improvements is now ready for public inspection.

It will be realized from these statements that no trifling powers have been at work preparing for post war reconstruction. While official direction has been concentrated upon the zoning of trades, the clearance of slums, and re-housing—besides meeting war time demands for urgent works—the æsthetic aspects of the problem have been in the care of a group of architects competent to give advice.

It becomes clear that the problem of remodelling London as an architectural entity requires intense sympathy for and consideration of distinguishing characteristics. Procedure may well be tedious and intricate. There is the necessity to guard against building speculation, the need to prevent the exploitation of sites and amenities; and above all the necessity to encourage designs for buildings which will be good to look upon.

If balance, combined with an imaginative ideal, is necessary to even approximate success in this gigantic task, it is obvious that some disinterested authority should be called into being to correlate activities already in motion. It has been suggested that the Royal Fine Arts Commission is the properly constituted body for the purpose. But it is important that the Commission as an entity should be given power to enforce the decisions it makes.

The gift of conveying an ideal into other situations does not lie within the power of a solitary individual, neither can this power be delegated to a corporate official Department whose chief functions are those of organization and supply. It is now recognized that public appreciation of architecture is valueless without patronage to architects. During the Middle Ages the autonomous rulings of the Church were of the utmost consequence to art; and throughout the period of the Renaissance, in Italy and Europe, princely patronage was equally beneficial. The effects of haphazard change during the second half of the nineteenth century reflect the decline of cultured patronage. Neither should it be supposed that a Royal Commission on art matters, having power to implement its decisions, would act in detriment to individual genius. On the contrary it would be the chief purpose of the Commission to discover and encourage talent of every kind.

We have, therefore, the beginnings of a system which is

forming to remodel the delicate fabric of Civic Art. The miracle is that this system is evolving out of the seeming chaos wrought by enemy action. It is a system which will adapt itself to meet contingencies; it is one to be encouraged and augmented, for it is the product of the national genius for improvisation.

The reference of all important designs to a controlling authority implies that these productions will at least be of a high standard before they are submitted. That is to say they will be intelligible and related to the problems of the moment. The architects can be counted upon to prepare competent plans and models, the exact degree of inherent beauty in these designs will be in direct ratio to the upbringing of the individuals as artists. It would be wrong to conceive meanly of the art; to say that its great days of production are past; the unending pursuit of the ideal can never languish. There remains, however, one cogent question: "Are there sufficient architects in England capable of undertaking works of civic importance?" If not, a post graduate school should be set up immediately, under Government auspices to encourage the study of Civic design. If this is not done the country will experience a spate of experiments in cube masses which will be horrific. We shall have the gasometer style.

The demand for beauty in architecture is nothing new, but when the demand becomes insistent, when public expectancy is more general than heretofore, the architect must look to his laurels. A good building strikes all who see it with pleasure. People comprehend silhouettes and proportions of structures, long before writers present them with scientific explanations as to the why and the wherefore of the mass and the parts. If one exquisite example of plastic skill can thrill ten thousand hearts how much more can be said in favour of a city where the buildings harmonize. We realize that the conditions essential to reconstruction on the great scale are present; but for the disasters of war we might have remained content to continue patchworking; to entertain ourselves with decadent essays, and to mistake vulgarity for progress. The late Professor Lethaby urged the necessity for a great tidying up. The proposals he advocated went far beyond casual clearance of dilapidated slum areas. He would have abolished redundant features wherever found; sweeping hideous advertisements and hoardings from town and countryside, inhibiting unnecessary signs, banning the trash lettering from façades and introducing a new economy into commerce. Events have proved

how right these proposals were. We have lived so easily that we have suffered the communications of vulgarity to become part of our background. The conditions of the past half century have not been conducive to intellectual art.

Now it is obvious that reform will be slow, and it is equally obvious that reconstruction must form part of a long term policy. The reconstruction of London after the Great Fire proved to be slow. First Wren's plan was not accepted; secondly, the rules and regulations governing rebuilding had to become part of a new building tradition. The ultimate effects of Wren's intervention as an organizer were the London Building Acts of the eighteenth century and the development of the magnificent streets and squares in a westerly direction. Thus nearly a century elapsed before the full measure of architectural reform was in motion. It is also significant that this beneficent form of town planning continued until the year 1856. Since then legislation has done little to maintain order in street architecture.

By proper vigilance the art of architecture can be brought once again to greatness, and can be employed with advantage for the embellishment of London. But mere diligence, or the accumulation of data cannot be expected to rebuild the Metropolis as a model for other cities to emulate. There must be apprehension of what is required, co-operation of interests, as well as artistic proficiency. It will be seen that among the preliminary stages of reconstruction, control of sites and buildings should take front place. Fresh legislation will be necessary; for many years the rationing of materials for priority works only will have to be considered. Speculative building must never again be allowed to flourish. In other words a consecutive programme, a sort of hundred years plan is foreshadowed. Our architects may be strong with desires and new thoughts, but the cultured public will remember that the new is but the old with a fresh mantle. The basic principles of the art are reflected over and over again; the most adventurous should shape all things for truth and continuity. The greatness and the quality of the English tradition in architecture provides a parallel for the intellectual artistry of the future. Here are exemplars and motifs for a thousand transmutations. Here can be found genuine inspiration, here is perceptible that strict consanguinity which is needed to harmonize artistry and structural ingenuity. It will be argued that artistic genius is rare, that it is given to few to be outstanding; but reflection will shew that one or two fine build-

ings can have an enormous influence on the mass of architectural opinion.

To frame a definite idea of London as it might be is a task for several groups of architects. A mind of single purpose is less suited to the labour, and is prone to create fantasies which will lack the barest elements of practicality. Yet it is permissible for anyone to indulge in speculative visions. If we make even a hurried examination of the problems we find it falls into two main sections; namely, the City of London and Westminster, and the amorphous mass of buildings we call greater London. All persons, whether expert or otherwise, understand that the most important natural feature is the River Thames. If a transformation scene is to be devised it should begin with the river frontage on the north bank. This of course refers to the City. The development of the southern bank is a natural sequence and should in course of time be dealt with. St. Paul's Cathedral is the focal point in the vista extending from Blackfriars to London Bridge. The towers and spires of the City Churches should be retained as dominant features of the skyline. The plan should include the clearance of the railway bridges and the extension of the riverside embankment to the Tower of London. The City of London would thus have the frontispiece it deserves. The south transept of St. Paul's with the majestic dome rising above would be seen terminating a freshly opened vista from the new embankment. The broad bosom of the river would reflect the face of new London as in a mirror. All the masterpieces of Wren's skill would be seen to full advantage, for it should be the purpose of the City of London to retain the spire of St. Bride's, the dragon-topped steeple of Bow and the graceful silhouettes of other Churches. I would go further and suggest that the damaged churches should be reroofed and used once more as places of worship for the citizens. What a scene this would be, one without compeer in the world—a river frontage of noble proportions, a new ordnance of city palaces. Avenues and new vistas to a noble piazza round St. Paul's with easy access to the open spaces conserved for the beauty of the City! Let us imagine this scene lit up by the sun at its rising and thrown into incomparable tones in westering splendour. This is an idea for a fragment of the New London which all desire. Of the replanning of inner and outer London, this is an aspect of the problem which belongs to less spectacular procedure. We must have widened streets, new round points, and awkward corners must be eliminated. Such things will help the problem

of transport and are no less vital to the future of the giant city even though they be less dramatic. No longer must London be regarded as an inchoate medley of parishes, a maze of submerged villages, or a collection of shoddy shopping centres. The new vistas should be consonant with linking green spaces; the high and the low trees of the squares should be brought into the picture; the parks should be made more mysterious and entrancing. Let us conserve our open spaces and create many more. Let us ask for wise legislation that will limit the height of buildings, let us petition for control that will encourage neighbourly manners in street architecture. It is the unexpectedness of London which is one of its greatest charms, the subtle blending of the architecture of all periods in which atmospheric effects conspire. The possibility of decentralizing certain markets and crowded industries should not be overlooked and as for the slums nothing should save them.

It would be the height of presumption to hint even at the re-building of the whole of London. Neither is such a drastic innovation proposed, except in irresponsible quarters. We should aim at sustained improvements and local remodellings, thinking always in terms of tone and colour. There is a good deal to be said in favour of paint and white tempera. Few to-day would agree with Carlyle, that stucco was an acrid putrescence, but we must concede that stucco demands fresh paint. The London of the future should be a monumental city, built of brick or stone, certainly not faced with hard bake such as terra cotta or finished with concrete which quickly deteriorates. And to ensure that London retained its antiquity in places where aught else would be impertinent, wise direction might exact rebuilding. Should we really tolerate the sweeping away of the terraces of Regent's Park? Are we likely to sanction those Teutonic barracks, passing for luxury flats, because some critics think England should be modern. It is to be doubted. The people who built Stuart and Georgian London were wiser. They understood London pride and reckoned with it. Even the Victorians did not transgress until wiseacres sought to imitate the pinchbeck glories of contemporary Paris and Vienna. The time for the iconoclasts came in the 'eighties of the last century when many of London's monuments were removed. Let us hope that these architectural relics now in exile may be returned to grace the damaged centres and to replace those treasures which have been destroyed. Londoners would acclaim the return of Temple Bar, they would support the return of the Pantheon façade,

and how they would welcome the pillar of Seven Dials, the doorway of Mercer's Hall, the front of Paul Pindar's House, and a score more fugitive specimens which rusticate in strange places!

And for conclusion let us think of the need for new approaches to London from the Home Counties. These should be of the broadest and noblest. Such vital avenues should be embellished with trees, not disgraced by factories or scabbed with worthless villas. The public is in mood for stately architecture, for new towers and spires, for something to remind posterity of the ordeal borne so bravely by millions.

Roads are required that will be inspiring promenades. The population must have space to breathe, to walk in comfort and safety. There should be no part of London unenviable to live in. Finally we must clear away the shopping and the office slums and train our shopkeepers and merchants to eschew great sheets of plate glass, to avoid overcrowding shop windows.

And so this monstrous ant hill could be tidied and made presentable and more as a preliminary to the realization of a great and reforming plan. Never again should we submit to the machinations of the building speculators or the blandishments of those who exploit the pleasures and the amenities of this mother of cities. Let us rise in our wrath clearing away redundant travesties, sweeping unnecessary lettering from façades, denuding buildings of ostentatious decoration and chastening abnormal skylines. And so practising the strictest economy we might set about the remodelling of London, but shall need the interest of our fellows and the wisdom of learned institutions. That London will rise resplendent is as certain as the victory which awaits our courage and our energy.

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PLANNING POST-WAR EUROPE

V. Reactions to a Defeated Germany

Prepared in co-operation with the Belgian, Polish and Czechoslovakian authorities by J. Emlyn Williams

THE views here expressed may well serve as a postscript to the critical comments on proposals regarding *The Future of Germany* which have appeared in the last three numbers of The Fortnightly. Those comments were written by outstanding Britishers. What follow are from well-qualified members of nations which have suffered under German tyranny and whose co-operation is essential to any lasting European understanding.

These people have lost homes and relatives and friends, consider themselves fortunate to have escaped concentration camps, have seen the work of generations wiped out by German banditry in a few months. They know that German occupation of their countries has followed a consistent plan of robbery of their economic wealth, denationalization of their centuries-old culture and of the utmost disregard for human values.

It is therefore not surprising that there should be a general demand that Germany should compensate for the material damage wilfully done to their countries and for guarantees that when victory comes, there shall not be a repetition of the mistakes of 1919. In this connection, the fact that the Atlantic Charter definitely lays down that German disarmament is first to be achieved is considered great progress.

None of these contributions is concerned with revenge. The fundamental question is how can their small states be guaranteed against future aggression. Once more the problem resolves itself into whether Great Britain (with Russia and U.S.A.) is prepared to assume the leadership of the New World and what will be the nature of that leadership. That will demand of this country the acceptance of certain definite obligations and commitments on the Continent. Britain's attitude towards post-war Germany, especially in the period immediately following the cessation of hostilities, will be for many small nations the key to their own future policy towards

that country and international ideals generally. The Czechoslovak writer significantly points out that states attacked and enslaved by the Third *Reich* will not be satisfied with a mere change of government in Germany. They also are much concerned as to whether this time the interests of European security rather than worries about the reconstruction of German economy will be first consideration. If so, then the very necessary military occupation of Germany will become the first step towards a reconstruction of that State's institutions, and so to a New Europe.

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Belgium

The problem of the future of Germany, when examined by a refugee, whose country has twice been invaded by the Germans within a quarter of a century, demands far more objectivity than when faced by a British citizen, even after last winter's ruthless bombing of London, and other large cities. This is also true of other continental peoples whose lands have been occupied by the forces of the *Reich*.

The desire for revenge is a strong one, and not easily eradicated from the human heart. The only way to guard against such primitive emotions is to keep before the mind the principle that revenge can never be the basis for a real and lasting settlement of any problem. However hard the cost, Belgians must hold to this principle, in the interests of the generations to come.

Delenda est Carthago, said Cato. Such a wholesale solution was possible in ancient times. But it is not possible to-day to wipe out a nation of 70 million inhabitants, especially a nation that has been settled in the centre of Europe for centuries. It is also foolish to believe that such a people can be kept for all time in a state of subjection. Neither can it be hoped to maintain separate entities, when the various groups, speaking the same language, decide on union.

"A fact is more respectable than a lord-mayor." The fact with which Belgians are faced is the existence of a united Germany in central Europe. The problem is to find how such a nation can be rendered harmless to the world around.

This at once raises the controversial question of the German character. The Germans are, biologically speaking, people of the same types as are found in other nations. If we do not accept this starting point, we fall into the same racial heresy as the National Socialists, in that we condemn the Germans as an inferior race.

It is of no purpose to try to prove from history that the Germans have been the only disturbers of the peace since the time of Tacitus. A historian would immediately counter this, if he is objectively minded, by citing the cases of the British of Plantagenet times, the Belgians under Tilly, the Swedes under Gustavus Adolphus, the French of Louis XIV's time, or under the leadership of Napoleon. The undisputed fact is that for the last three-quarters-of-a-century the Germans have been the warrior people in Europe. This development on their part has been due *not* to biological characteristics, inherited through the transmission of certain physical traits, but to other factors, economic, historical, educational, and political, all of which have been freely analysed in many quarters. This proneness to war on the part of the German is a *social* inheritance, which we must hope can be changed by the right treatment of its root causes.

The immediate problem is how to protect Belgium against the existing German mentality, and its translation at any future time into a recurrence of aggression.

The long-range problem is of another nature. Measures of defence and protection cannot last for ever. The only hope is to work for the changing of the German mentality, and for a general settlement, in which the causes of war will be eliminated. These two policies must be discussed in greater detail.

The immediate post-war period will have to work on the principle that Germany is still " bad Germany." The mentality of the youth of a nation, educated in National Socialist and Prussian ideology, will not change suddenly after defeat. Whatever social and economic transformations there may be, whatever political changes may take place, however sincere the promises of the new leaders may be, we cannot afford to take them on trust, and without proper precautions. Even the conquered people itself would fail to understand such immediate trust, especially if there were political disorders.

Satisfaction will have to be given to the profound desire for punishment of the guilty on the part of the conquered peoples, and of humanity at large. It is suggested that ordered, legal punishment of the criminal leaders, designated by public opinion in the occupied countries should be carried out, swiftly and spectacularly. Even if many hundreds of death sentences should have to be carried out, it should be done so that belief in justice may be restored, and the crimes of the past expiated. This would serve as a first gesture, also, towards disassociating the German people from their criminal leaders. With

this in mind, it is suggested that any clause demanding recognition from Germany of responsibility for the war should be deleted from any future peace settlement. In the Treaty of Versailles this war guilt clause was a seed of rancour for future generations who themselves never knew the war.

On the matter of reparations, too, we should walk warily. Remembering the mistakes that were made after the last war, it is realized that reparations in money, spread over a long period, disorganize the economy not only of the debtors but also of the creditor countries. The devastated countries must, however, be allowed to recover from Germany certain materials and goods of which they have been robbed. This should be easily realized.

All this will necessitate a military occupation of Germany. Such an occupation should have an *Allied* character, as far as is possible. It is important that the purpose of this occupation should be made clear to the German people from the outset by proclamation or other suitable means. They should be made to realize that their own leaders have brought them to this pass, and that the Allies have come into their country, not to destroy it, as the National Socialists did in the countries occupied by them, but to help its people to build up a new peaceful, democratic Germany, where justice rules. Belgians believe that this occupation should last for about twenty years, a period long enough to allow a new generation to grow up, free from the pernicious influences of the past. It will be an interesting opportunity to prove whether the German, freed from the economic, political, and educational influences of the past, is still cast in a different mould from the other peoples of Europe. On the other hand, it is just possible that the generation among the victors, which never suffered from the German occupation, will be unwilling to support the burden of occupation for so long a period.

As far as long-term policy is concerned, much of its success will depend upon the spirit in which the immediate problems are handled. It is believed that if every country is prepared to make sacrifices in the general interest, and if Germany can be convinced that a new world is being built in which that country has an honourable part, there will follow a change of heart on the part of the Germans.

Both in the economic and political spheres the Allies will have to adopt a practical thorough-going attitude. A proposal to work along the lines of the British Commonwealth of Nations is to be avoided. As eminent authors point out, rightly

Belgians believe, the Statute of Westminster was essentially based upon the affinity of the English-speaking peoples, and therefore cannot be of great help where continental peoples are concerned.

In addition to being prepared to accept certain limitations of its sovereignty in the interests of the whole, each nation should abide by the clearly defined commitments and duties, which fall to its lot. These should of course be of a limited nature, since it is not believed that a world constitution can be set up at the outset.

In conclusion, let it be said that Belgians, like Professor Murray,* believe in the advisability of an armistice, which should last over several years, and forestall an attempt to find a world solution immediately. This armistice should be politically and militarily severe, but economically generous. Germany will have to be fed as well as the occupied countries. There must be an effort to prevent the victors exploiting the situation for private advantage, and the occupying military force should reveal itself not as the gaoler of Germany, but as the guardian of peace in Europe and in Germany itself.

If this can be carried out, the problem of Germany as such will disappear from the earth, and the settlement of a true peace begin to be a reality.

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Poland

The Eight Point Declaration of August 14, 1941, issued by President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill, outlines those fundamental principles which, in the words of Mr. Eden, "must govern not only the post-war relations of Great Britain and her Allies with Germany, but all international relations in general." This declaration aims at the establishment "after the destruction of Nazi tyranny," of "universal security," to be achieved through "the disarmament of nations which threaten aggression outside of their frontiers," and "fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field." These aims, if realized, should lead gradually to co-operation among the nations in the political field as well.

Without security there can be no peace. Poland is naturally vitally interested in a peace plan which will give security by removing once and for all the age-old menace of the German *Ost-Politik*, directed against Eastern and Central Europe, from East Prussia to the so-called Moravian Gate and further to-

*Professor Gilbert Murray, O.M., in the discussion on *The Future of Germany* (P.E.P.). THE FORTNIGHTLY, October, 1941.

wards the South East to the borders of the Ukraine, Rumania and the Balkans.

The Polish Foreign Minister, Count Raczynski, in his speech at the Inter-Allied Conference on September 24 last, stressed the importance of Poland emerging from this war with undiminished territory. He also made it clear that Poland's future frontiers must be able to afford it full security within the framework of European security as a whole, and that access to the sea must be provided on such a scale as to put an end to all foreign interference in the life of the country.

The Allies will have to consider carefully the treatment to be meted out to Germany at the close of the war. Two circumstances will have to be borne in mind, first, that Germany has proved itself the only aggressor in Europe, and, secondly, that a defeated Germany will doubtless once again resort to the old stratagem of preparing a war of revenge, if steps are not taken to counter this.

The Polish nation has learnt by bitter experience that no trust can be placed in German good faith. They maintain, therefore, with full knowledge of the issues at stake, that the measures to be taken against Germany at the close of the war must be so effective as to secure lasting peace and security for her neighbours.

These measures, to be really effective, must include the disarmament of Germany, the scrapping of its war materials, the suppression of its munition factories, control by the Allies of German machinery and chemical production and the transfer of shipping and rolling stock to countries whose resources have been depleted as a result of the war. The most practical means to these ends are to be found in the military occupation by the Allies of key positions in Germany. The establishment of Allied naval and air bases in Denmark and along the Polish sea board, as well as the demilitarization of the Kiel Canal will be essential to ensure the freedom of sea traffic to and from the Baltic.

Security, according to the Polish viewpoint however, would not to be complete without the evacuation to the *Reich* or to sparsely-populated parts of the globe of the German population in Poland, which has for many years been carrying on subversive propaganda and fifth column activity. Polish nationals forcibly detained in Germany, must be repatriated.

The wholesale destruction by the Germans of Polish cultural life should likewise be taken into account. It is a question whether Germany should not be made responsible for these

depredations, and forced to rebuild, as far as it is possible, the universities, laboratories, schools, museums, archives and libraries, which the German " overlords " have pillaged with a ruthlessness unprecedented in history.

After the war there will be need for a complete and definite solution of the German question. Such a solution is possible, if backed by all the Allies, and enforced by the concerted action of all free nations, including Great Britain and a constructively-minded Soviet Russia. These nations should work together for the establishment of a new world order, based on the principles of the Atlantic Charter, and imbued with the spirit of true Christianity. Against this common front of superior moral and material forces any single-handed attempt on the part of Germany to renew her policy of aggression would be doomed to failure.

Germany will not be ripe for some time to become a fully fledged member of the European comity of Nations. Until that time, she should not be entitled to take part in any international organizations on an equal footing with the Allied nations, since this might offer her the chance of gaining an undue ascendancy in European affairs, " The German people," says F. W. Foerster, " cannot be reconciled with Europe until they have been reconciled with the truth."

* * * * *

Czechoslovakia

Czechoslovakia always desired good relations with Germany, and it is possible to say that, until 1933, relations between the two states were correct.

It is almost impossible to believe, however, that there will be a resumption immediately the war is over of the good neighbourly relations, which were broken from the German side as soon as Hitler came to power.

If we dare hope that this will be the last war in Europe, we must also hope that in the course of time Germany itself will come under those influences, which will enable its people to behave as a civilized nation, capable of living in peaceful and lasting community with the other nations of Europe.

It must be realized, however, that in the immediate future those states that have been attacked, enslaved and inhumanly tyrannized by Germany, cannot forget their years of suffering at the hands of the Germans and that they will not consider the account settled as soon as a change of government takes place in Germany. Like the other victims of Germany, Czechoslovakia, too, will demand that those responsible shall be severely punished—as an example. By this we mean quite

literally punishment affecting life and property, and the ruthless extermination of all those individuals in Germany, who have shown themselves incapable of obeying the elementary laws of humanity.

After individuals have been dealt with, it will be necessary to consider the German state as a whole, especially with a view to rendering it harmless for the future. Czechoslovakia is too small in comparison with Germany to be able to force a lasting peace upon its restless neighbour. It is however in the interest of humanity to prevent Germany from plunging the world into a new war, so Czechoslovakia will partake in any common action, which the victors will undertake to this end.

It goes without saying that Germany will have to make good the material damage she has caused, as far as this is possible. The results of the reparations measures after the last war provide a good lesson for the victors, and should help them to avoid the mistakes of that time. Germany has herself shown in this war how easily and quickly a conquered country can be exploited, and can hardly protest if her own method is one day applied to herself.

Germany should not be permitted to keep one square inch of the territory conquered during Hitler's régime. Pre-Munich Germany must be the maximum kept by Germany after this war, if the German people are to learn that war does not pay. At the same time, the right must be reserved for those neighbours of Germany, who are most threatened, to demand such changes of frontier as will assure them greater security in the future. Czechoslovakia seeks no territorial aggrandisement at the expense of Germany, but it is possible that for strategic reasons she will demand a small modification of her frontier in certain places.

The disarmament of Germany is a demand that there is no need to dilate upon. It was put forward by the Allies after the last war, but it was not fully carried out, for they did not realize that it was not a purely military question. A certain quantity of German war material was indeed destroyed; but the whole German industrial potential was left untouched, thereby enabling Germany to rearm secretly, until in 1935 she was able to arm openly at top speed. Real disarmament of Germany means destruction of that potential, that is to say the lowering of Germany's possible industrial output. This might cause economic difficulties for a time in over-industrialized Germany, but the interests of European security are greater than the temporary interests of the German economy. And, although

Germany would have to suffer economically before she could adapt herself to her de-industrialized economic position, this would be a far lesser evil than the suffering brought upon the world through another war started by Germany.

The temporary military occupation of Germany is also a fundamental matter. All military occupations are disagreeable; but there are great differences between the typical German brutal occupation and the liberal Allied military occupation of the Rhineland. An Allied occupation should not imitate German methods, but it must be sufficiently severe, to achieve its aim of security, and secondly to afford a lasting lesson to the German people. At the present moment it is hard to answer the question as to how far the Allies can intervene in the internal organization of Germany. It would certainly be in the interest of Germany and of her future relations with the Allies, if the Germans themselves were to carry out certain essential reforms, before being compelled to do so. The decentralization of the state, the breaking of the political domination of Prussia over the other German provinces, the breaking of the economic domination of the agrarian *Junkers* and the industrial magnates—these are a few, though not all of the conditions from which any re-organization must grow.

Germany will deceive none of the Allies by the mere change of her outer political façade. The change must be fundamental, and if the Germans do not carry it out themselves, the Allies will do it for them. The old ruling caste must be cleared out, and the whole system of school education completely revised. Should it become evident that the present network of German railways was built with more attention to military considerations than to those of communication, measures must be taken to alter this. In fact, everything must be destroyed in which the victors see any possibility of danger for the future, without sentimentality, but without unnecessary brutality. It will be essential to bear in mind always the fact that the interests of the whole world stand higher than the interests of the one nation which threatened the whole world.

It is not only inappropriate, but also purely academic to consider whether the Germans as a whole are guilty, or whether the guilt should be laid at Hitler's door. No war anywhere in the world has yet been waged with the approval of a full 100 per cent. of the nation which provoked it. The Napoleonic Wars, although purely defensive at first, were carried on against the will of a large section of the French nation at that time, but the whole French nation had to bear the consequences.

Such must be the case with Germany, all the more since her war has been aggressive from the beginning, and carried out with a brutality unparalleled in history, and since Hitler was not, like Napoleon an usurper, but was elected to his position in ordinary elections. Even those Germans who were opposed to the war must bear the consequences of defeat. One of these consequences will be the political and moral quarantine into which Germany will be put, until such time as she shows that she is fit to be received as a member, with full rights, of the comity of nations. When this will be, it is difficult to say. It would certainly be a matter for rejoicing if the Germany of Goethe or Beethoven were to rise quickly from the ruins in which Hitler's Germany has been buried. But for the last eighty years the German nation has been so systematically fed with chauvinistic doctrine and belief in its own superiority, and for the last ten years has been so moulded into the most barbaric bestiality, that a quick change cannot be looked for in Germany.

Other nations before the Germans have disturbed the peace of Europe, and have desisted when they realized that they could not carry out their plan of permanent domination in face of the opposition of the rest of the Continent. The hope is not excluded then that the Germans too will reach this state, after their bitter experience.

As has been said before, when discussing the economic future of Europe, Czechoslovaks agree with the principles of the Atlantic Charter, according to which all nations are to be assured their economic existence. No measures will be opposed which will enable Germany to support her population, but Czechoslovaks are certainly opposed to the principle followed in the last war, whereby first consideration was given to helping the defeated enemy, while the victorious Allies in central Europe were left to overcome the post-war economic crisis as best they could.

As far as Czechoslovakia is concerned her relations with Germany will be determined by her experience of recent years. Even when Germany has been disarmed and has ceased to be a danger to her neighbours, Czechoslovakia will be on guard, and it will be hard to erase from her memory the agony she has gone through.

NAZI OIL

By W. Landsberg

EVER since the world began to realize the growing Nazi menace to the maintenance of peace between the nations, economic and military experts have repeatedly predicted that Hitler would never take the risk of plunging Germany into a major war. With overseas supplies cut off by the British blockade, his indigenous resources would not be able to provide the necessary raw materials for his war machine. Above all, he would not have enough oil.

Nevertheless, the Nazis started war. They boasted it would be a short war, and it was almost generally believed it could be nothing but that. For, it was argued, their vast stocks, accumulated in the years of peace, might well enable them to wage a *blitzkrieg*, but in no circumstances would they be capable of prolonged fighting. If not for many other reasons, they would run short of oil.

Meanwhile, two years of war have passed. The Nazis have made themselves "masters" of nearly the whole continent of Europe. Their U-boats are still haunting the oceans, and for five months their tanks, aeroplanes and other species of motorized units have been using up hundreds of thousands of tons of liquid fuels on and over Russian soil—in a total war of unprecedented ferocity. Yet there seems to be no indication of any imminent shortage of oil. Have all the predictions of the experts been mere wishful thinking? Or have the Nazis developed any secret devices to overcome their oil deficiencies, allowing them to carry on mechanized warfare indefinitely?

A brief analysis of the most typical expert views may provide some answer to these questions. Usually these estimates have been based on the following assumptions: (1) War-time oil demand would be at least twice, but possibly three or four times as high as peace-time consumption. (2) Total home production of mineral oils from indigenous crude oils and coal, which was lagging behind peace-time requirements by a wide margin, could consequently cover but a fraction of war-time needs, even if no allowance was made for destruction of plant

as a result of bombing. But the latter would substantially reduce Germany's oil producing capacity, particularly as regards synthetic oil output. (3) Oil imports from overseas, which until the war were equivalent to as much as 75 per cent. of the *Reich's* total requirements, would completely cease, while shipments from potential European suppliers would be severely restricted by transport difficulties. (4) Stocks, not being capable of replenishment, were bound to dwindle rapidly under the strain of war demands.

While there has been a good deal of truth in these assumptions, they should not have been accepted without qualification. To begin with the question of war-time requirements, it must be kept in mind that a reliable assessment even of peace-time requirements has been fairly difficult. Official or semi-official statements to this effect, if obtainable at all, have mostly been confined to computed figures, giving no indication as to whether or not these included government requirements, military demands, stocks, and such like. But estimates of war needs used to lack any substantial basis whatever. Numerous writers on this problem contented themselves with quoting the German military economist, Dr. Friedensburg, who, in 1937, put total oil requirements of a Great Power during " total war " at between 15 and 20 million tons a year. As this figure, incidentally, was then equivalent to over three times the old *Reich's* oil consumption, almost generally it has been taken for granted that it was extremely conservative, considering that meanwhile German oil requirements had risen to about 7.5 million tons by 1938.

Naturally, oil consumption by hundreds of thousands of high-powered motorized units during intense fighting is a multiple of peace-time demand. But it should be remembered that, until the start of the Eastern campaign, these periods of intense fighting were limited to a few weeks of fierce, rapidly striking " blitzes," followed by many months of comparative calmness.

Moreover, the quantitative fuel requirements of certain categories of mechanized forces, in particular of the air forces, have mostly been overestimated. A multi-engined bomber, it is true, eats a lot of petrol while in the air, a 2,000 h.p. machine consuming nearly half a ton per hour ; on the average, however, such machines do only a few hours flying a day, while their normal operational strength has been much below those formidable four and five figures, with which Goering's boasts have tried to impress the world for years. Mass attacks, keeping

anything like 1,000 planes in the air at the same time, have so far been exceptional.

With military activities constantly changing both in dimensions and intensity, it has indeed proved futile to engage in forecasts of military oil demand; nor has there been much sense in working out estimates of annual consumption on the basis of some vaguely computed figures of weekly requirements during a specified phase of operations in the past. It was largely due to the misinterpretation of such figures—at least during the period preceding the invasion of Russia—that Germany's total military oil consumption was so often grossly exaggerated.

On the other hand, the scope for drastic cuts in civilian oil demand has not been sufficiently realized. Though the *Reich's* industrial capacity, as well as rail, river and coastal traffic have been appreciably expanded for the benefit of war production, the substitution for liquid fuels of such alternative means of propulsion as coal, gas, electricity, etc., has been carried out on a large scale. Besides, the almost complete cessation of overseas trade and most severe restrictions of private motoring have resulted in the complete elimination of hundreds of thousands of oil consuming units on the roads and on the high seas. In this way, several million tons of liquid fuels could be saved in a year.

It is true that these savings within the *Reich* have been more than offset by the additional requirements of all the occupied and Nazi-controlled territories now to be supplied by Germany. Against this, however, it has to be taken into account that the economic life of these countries has been more or less paralysed under the New Order, except for such industries as are now compelled to serve the German war machine. On the whole, fuel economy in Nazi-Europe outside the *Reich* has been effected to the largest possible extent. In these circumstances, it would appear quite reasonable to assume that Hitler's total oil requirements prior to the start of the Eastern campaign did not much exceed 10 million tons a year.

At the same time, it must not be overlooked that some of these satellite states are by themselves making substantial contributions to Germany's oil supplies. The combined output of Polish, Austrian, Slovakian and French petroleum fields equals Germany's own crude oil production before the war, while a number of coal-oil plants in these last-mentioned countries constitute valuable additions to the *Reich's* synthetic oil production. But much more important is the fact that

Germany is now in complete control of Rumania's crude oil production of some 5½ million tons a year. This had hardly been foreseen by any of the economic critics, most of whom had taken it for granted that, as in the last war, these oil fields would rather be destroyed by their owners than yielded to the Germans.

Thus, taking into account all the potential oil resources of Europe, Hitler has—" theoretically "—at his disposal some 7 million tons of crude oil and about 5 million tons of synthetic coal-oil, supplementary and substitute fuels (e.g. alcohol, benzole, producer gas, liquid gas, etc.), a total of some 12 million tons. This is about four times the quantity he had control of when starting the war.

If he could get hold of these 12 million tons, he would probably be able to cover the bulk of his present requirements of finished petroleum products. Actually he cannot. Numerous raids on coal-oil plants, refineries, fuel depots and oil fields in German-dominated territories, including Rumania, undoubtedly had serious effects on current production, though it is impossible to estimate the extent of losses inflicted in this way. The frequent repetition of such attacks on the same targets clearly shows the considerable difficulty of their complete destruction; and in no instance has evidence yet been provided that it has been achieved. With the high standard of engineering to-day damage can be repaired in a relatively short time and a good many plants have so far escaped any damage at all, so we should beware of easy optimism in this respect. Failure to do so may have been responsible for more than one rosy report on the " crippling of the Nazi oil industry."

The same applies to many of the comments on Hitler's transport problems, particularly as regards shipments of Rumanian oil. While it is perfectly true that, after the closing of the sea route from Constantza via the Mediterranean and the Atlantic (over which over three-quarters of all Rumanian oil imports arrived before the war), Germany cannot carry anything like that country's total oil output into the *Reich* territory, it should be remembered that this has never been aimed at since the spreading of the war into the Mediterranean zone. Leaving aside Rumania's own oil consumption, which had already approached 2 million tons in 1939, the availability of " direct " oil supplies to the other Balkan countries, to Italy and to the Southern and South-eastern Axis armies has only been of advantage to the Germans.

Moreover, the capability of rapidly expanding rail and river

transport facilities to the *Reich* must have surprised the sceptics. The shipment during the second half of 1940 of well over 1 million tons of oil over these routes alone has testified to the Nazi's remarkable success in tackling a particularly difficult task, which foreshadows further material improvements in this direction. For the student of transport problems it should provide a most valuable lesson on what can be accomplished even under most unfavourable conditions.

But another still more important lesson has to be learnt. Any pre-war assessment of German war-time oil supplies was bound to be unavailing if based on the *Reich's* political status prior to September, 1939. In fact, every estimate had to be based on that status. No expert could possibly have anticipated the actual course of developments, all the treacherous Nazi assaults on neutral neighbours, the sudden collapse of France, the cold subjugation of Rumania, and the many other events, which—in less than two years and with a comparatively small military effort—have brought about the transition of the old *Reich* into the temporary Hitler-Europe of to-day.

Thus, the whole picture of Germany's oil position has fundamentally changed, not only as regards her sources of current supplies, but also in respect of stocks. Although appreciable quantities of oil products in the storage tanks of the occupied countries have been destroyed under the noses of the invaders, the remaining booty must still have been of considerable magnitude, as proved by the incessant R.A.F. raids on tank installations in these territories. There can be little doubt that the looted reserves, in addition to the many hundred thousand tons imported from Russia prior to last spring and to the several million tons accumulated in the Nazis' own storage tanks before the war, have proved an invaluable help in making up for deficiencies in current production.

So far so good. In retrospect, it would seem that after all there was not so much of a mystery about the Third *Reich's* fuel supplies. It would, in fact, appear as if the Nazis' combined political, military and industrial efforts have cleverly overcome all those obstacles which so much outside criticism had regarded as insurmountable. If this be so, would it imply that they can be expected to be equally successful in the future?

In view of the disappointing results of previous predictions, no useful purpose could be served by attempting further forecasts, not even on the revised basis which over two years' war-time experience provides. Reasonable estimates are practicable only under more or less static conditions; they cannot make

allowance for the dynamics of war-time developments. It was largely due to these dynamics that so far the Nazis have succeeded in repeatedly turning the tide to their favour and in overcoming many a critical stage in their oil position.

Yet it seems obvious that they could not achieve more than just keeping the balance between demand and supplies by drawing on their stocks. Such a situation can hardly be regarded as satisfactory by the Germans themselves. Further sharp reductions of civilian oil consumption all over Hitler-Europe, coupled with new endeavours to increase rapidly Rumanian oil output, have already given evidence of their uneasiness. So have their persistent, though frustrated, efforts to get a foothold in the oil riches of Iraq and Iran. Now the world witnesses their desperate drive towards the Caucasian petroleum fields.

If successful it would, of course, relieve them from many anxieties; if not, however, it is bound to increase their difficulties manifold. The five months Russian campaign has already cost the Germans far more oil than any of their major operations in the preceding 22 months of war. For the first time the *blitzkrieg* technique is not working according to plan. Instead, the German High Command is faced with the necessity of carrying on a relentless struggle, involving a motor fuel consumption of unheard-of dimensions. A recent analysis by the Petroleum Press Bureau puts Nazi minimum oil requirements on the Eastern front at 300,000 tons a month, while other estimates have arrived at much higher figures. At any rate, the war against the Soviets cannot fail to tax the German oil resources to the utmost.

Moreover, the question of the adequacy of oil supplies cannot be answered in terms of tons alone. The qualitative aspects of the problem are no less important. Are all the various grades of aviation spirit, motor gasoline, diesel oil, fuel oil, lubricants, etc. available to cover the constantly changing needs of the Nazi war machine? Reliable information on this vital point is, of course, no longer obtainable, but it may be recalled that in the last war it was the qualitative rather than quantitative deficiencies in oil supplies which substantially accelerated the military collapse of the Kaiser's *Reich*. In particular, the difficulty in providing the necessary supplies of high-grade lubricating oils—though a small item in the list of total requirements—created a most perilous situation and seriously strained Germany's economic life towards the end of the war.

This is especially noteworthy in view of the fact that during

the whole period 1914-1918 Germany had not experienced any acute oil shortage, and was even in a position to export certain quantities of oil. Yet—in the words of Dr. Friedensburg, the military expert already mentioned earlier in this article—" the constant uncertainty as to whether the necessary supplies for the immediate future could be secured had a highly depressing and paralysing effect on both the troops and their commanders, which eventually was mainly responsible for the consequent process of general disintegration."

Whether history will repeat itself nobody is able to foretell. All we can ascertain at the moment is the fact that the Nazis are most anxious to strengthen their oil position. The only effective ways still open to them would seem to be the conquest of Russia's oil regions and the rapid expansion of synthetic oil production at home. As to the former, we may take it for granted that the Russians, in co-operation with their allies, will spare no effort to prevent their oil riches from falling into Nazi hands. As to the latter, we can be equally sure that systematic and unrelenting bombing should go a long way not only to checking the further growth of the German coal-oil industry but to substantially reducing its working capacity.

Indeed, the ever-mounting weight of the allied air offensive gives solid reason for confidence that the resumption on a large scale of attacks on vital oil objectives would meet with conspicuous success. Yet for no moment should we lose sight of the fact that any really decisive blow against the life-lines of the Nazi oil supplies will be an extremely hard and lengthy task, fraught with many still incalculable difficulties.

(Mr. Landsberg was formerly Assistant Editor of the Petroleum Press Bureau, and until war began was in charge of the German edition of the Petroleum Press Service.)

CULTURE AND DIPLOMACY

By Roger Lloyd

WHEN Alexander Hamilton wrote the preamble to the Constitution of the U.S.A. he permitted himself to refer to the Greek City States as "those wretched nurseries of a thousand discontents." The fact that Hellas bequeathed a bountiful and imperishable legacy to all mankind does not prevent the judgment from being true. The Greek City States did actually destroy themselves by their unhealed feuds. Only the other day President Benes, who probably has a deeper knowledge of European realities than any other living statesman, thought it necessary to give a warning to the Federal Unionists that after the war the chronic feuds of Europe would be so much deeper, tougher, and more intractable than ever before, that the federal organization of the continent would be out of the question for many years to come.

Though centuries may divide them, all the prophets who point to Europe's chronic state of feud as the greatest of all the barriers between our dreams of peace and their accomplishment have a nasty habit of being right. As long as they remain in being to divide man from man there can be no peace, and therefore the foreign policy of the European nations for many years to come must consist of the effort to appease and bury the feuds. That is to say that statesmanship will have to succeed this time where it has consistently failed in the past, and the racial hatreds with which it will presently have to deal will be ten times more fully charged with the dynamic vitriol of hate than they have been before. One need only consider the Balkans to see that this must be so. The Balkan nations have never been remarkable for their loving kindness towards each other at the best of times. What they must think about each other now staggers the imagination; and a turbulent Balkan peninsular always means a disturbed Europe. The Balkans, moreover, are only one corner of a suffering continent. Is there really any hope at all that we can succeed in doing this time, in out and away more difficult conditions, what we have never suc-

seeded in doing yet? Perhaps the answer is that we have *got* to succeed. Either we heal those feuds or we perish: those are the stark alternatives.

When the victory has been won, the hungry fed, Germany completely and unilaterally disarmed, and some sort of interim order set up, the work of feud appeasement will have to start. Everybody is now so eloquent about this problem that the discussion is becoming remarkably reminiscent of a works meeting held by the labourers on the Tower of Babel, and the result is a gale of words fast thickening into an impenetrable fog. The step which can be taken now and at once is therefore to see whether it is possible to let a little daylight into that fog. Perhaps we might begin to do this by reminding ourselves that the statesmen of Versailles did honestly set themselves the goal that is also ours. They really did try to draw the map of the European boundaries in such a way as to bring as many people as was possible within the sphere of their own racial seat of government, and thus to give the feuds less food to live and thrive on. Of course they failed. We can see now that they never really had much chance of succeeding. But it is not realistic to suppose that our own peacemaking diplomats will necessarily be wiser or better men than their predecessors. Their problems will be more intractable; and it is never true to say that human beings will hesitate to put their unhealed racial grievances to the test of war merely because they are intellectually convinced that war is an exceedingly dangerous occupation. People are not governed by their intellects but by their hearts and their imaginations.

It seems, therefore, that not merely a new start but a new kind of start is required. Down the ages the business of peacemaking, which is essentially the task of healing feuds and giving greatly wronged nations the necessary time for psychological recovery, has always been considered a function of diplomacy and hence a job for statesmen. During the last five hundred years the financiers and the economists have gradually edged themselves into this sphere—and rightly so, because there is plainly a direct connection between the healing of feuds and the internationalizing of finance and industry so as to make the economic wellbeing of one country dependent on that of all the others. The new start therefore begins with the questioning of this hitherto fundamental assumption. Is it really the fact that the proper people to be given the job of healing feuds are the professional diplomats and the economists? Their record of consistent failure in the past suggests that it is not, and only

a little reflection is required to see that they must necessarily be the wrong people.

Statesmen must do their work by concluding formal treaties and agreements. They have the official, the government point of view. They are paid to protect and advance their own country's interests, and however enlightened a definition they give to that phrase, they are still no more than trustees, whose first duty is to their constituents, whom they must not commit too deeply, or to their too great loss. Thus they must do things for the people, but never with the people. For them, the people are the public, the raw material of their trade, of whom the first thing asked is that they should be malleable. They construct their legal boxes, and expect the people to fit into them. They have invented a technical process at no point of which do the broad masses of the people, which are the real heart of the feuds, have the chance to take the only step which can heal the feuds, that of getting to know each other. The financiers are even worse because, although themselves trustees, they are far less directly responsible to their constituents. They have given to international finance a name which stinks everywhere; and they form their cartels and trusts, which are yet more boxes for people to live in, only the walls of these boxes are like those of the inquisitor's dungeon, which slowly contract and crush all within them. This is not to suggest that Europe can find a new basis for its life or a healing of its feuds without the help of the statesmen and financiers, but only that their true function in the process should not be mistaken or magnified. Their work is to construct a framework within which it may be possible for others to set themselves hopefully to the work of healing the feuds and appeasing the enmities. This framework should be as sparse, simple, and above all as elastic as possible.

But if this is so, where are we to find the real peace-makers? Plainly they must be drawn from the broad masses of the people, and they must not be in any sense trustees for anyone but themselves. In the end, they are simply the common people, to whom peace is always the most vital of all their interests, and who have never yet had the chance to make or keep it. And among them, the most hopeful groups are first the student and then the trades union world. Let us at the very first possible moment after the war set the international student world on its feet again. Of all classes of men the students and the artists mix the best. They already have something of the international mind for they are all the time using

and contributing to the supra-national heritage. Music and art have always triumphantly resisted the nationalist limitations and they do so still. In any study, immediately the rudimentary stages have been passed, the student must have access to books coming from all the nations, and in the more advanced stages, he must generally go to that city which is the European centre of his own field of scholarship. When the war is over, the first piece of rebuilding will obviously have to be the homes of the people in the bombed cities. But the second should not be the government offices or the financial houses, but the universities, the libraries, the concert halls, and the art galleries. Paper should be given first to the publishers of scholarly books and learned periodicals. If we can quickly set the student world on its feet again and equip it with the tools of its trade, we shall then get a swift and constant mixing of the students and the artists of Europe, and a real start to appease the feuds will have been made.

The second group is that of the trades unionists. Trades union members are as liable as other people to take their racial feuds passionately, and they have never yet refused to support a war. But even when they are in the thickest part of the fighting they have never completely forgotten the ideal of human brotherhood, to which they are pledged and which it is their mission to uphold. They have always had something of the international mind, and have never forgotten their kinship with the trades unionists of other countries, even with those of the countries which are their enemies. The trades union leader engaged on international negotiation has his own constituents to consider first, just as any diplomat does; but his constituents are themselves among the more internationally minded sections of the whole population. Therefore the second thing to set on its feet when the war is over is the International Trades Union Congress. There would be very much to be said for keeping it in permanent session.

The best and quickest way to end feuds is also the simplest. It is to bring the parties to them into contact with each other in a growing intimacy on equal terms. The parties are simply the people. Hitherto the ordinary wage earner and farm labourer has never had the chance to get to know his opposite number in another nation. The difficulties and expenses of travel have always forbidden it, and the hours that most people have to work and the scantiness of their holidays have made foreign travel impossible for all but the few. But after the war it will be within our power to remove all those barriers. No

limit can be set to the development of air transport. By making finance our servant and not our master, transport could be made and kept cheap, and hours of work and length of holidays not such as to prohibit foreign travel for the masses. The language difficulty is not insuperable. It only needs that one agreed foreign language should be taught in every school in Europe. When the war is over it would be difficult to imagine any single act more charged with hope than the abolition of all passports within Europe.

To heal the feuds *is* possible, for Europe is made to be at unity within itself. For five hundred years or more of its history it was such a unity. What made it so was not merely the framework of the Holy Roman Empire, nor even the universally accepted language and values of Christendom, though these were essential instruments. The real peace-makers of Europe were the students in the great mediæval universities of Paris and Bologna, and the great schools such as Chartres. They were anything but quiet and well behaved, but when they flourished racial feuds began to wither, and when they declined the feuds grew again. And to-day some of us are looking first to the universities and the art centres of Europe to lead us to the things which belong to our peace.

THE OUTLOOK IN RUSSIA

By Major-General Sir Charles Gwynn

WHEN I wrote last month the renewed offensive towards Moscow, which presumably was the chief feature in what Hitler had announced would be the last and greatest effort of the *Reichswehr* this year, had just started. There can be little doubt that Hitler hoped and probably believed that the offensive would place him in possession of Moscow, even if it did not achieve the total destruction of Timoshenko's Army. For a time the situation was desperately critical but Russian resistance, aided certainly by appalling weather, has brought the Germans to a standstill 40 miles short of the city at the nearest point. Ground has been won and casualties in the Russian Army have certainly been very heavy, but on the whole the offensive, so far, has proved a failure. Notably there has been a failure to isolate the city by thrusts in the Kalinin region in the north and Orel and Tula in the south.

There has been desperate fighting in, as the Germans themselves admit, terrible conditions of cold and mud, which cannot fail to have reduced German infantry to an advanced stage of exhaustion and caused rapid deterioration of mechanical vehicles.

What the offensive obviously achieved, however, was the strategic immobilization of the Russian central army and reserves. This must have relieved von Rundstedt of anxiety for his left flank and enabled him to renew his drive in the Donetz basin with confidence. Budyonny's Army, exhausted and weakened by losses of men and material in its long retreat, and having expended reserves in the disastrous attempt to relieve pressure on the Crimea, was in no condition to meet attack. There were undoubted signs of disorganization and perhaps in some places of will to resist. The situation became more critical than it had even been at Moscow, and it seemed possible that the lines of Donetz and Don would be crossed before the front could be restored. It was hard to set a limit to the success the drive might achieve. Weather again seems to have come to the assistance of the Russians, especially in the Rostov area. There the Russian defence held firmly. In view of the situation it is not surprising that Stalin decided to reorganize the command of his armies. Budyonny, though evidently a capable general, had not shown the same capacity in defensive and delaying operations as had Timoshenko. It was a wise step, therefore, to place the latter in charge of the southern front; and there are clear indications that he has again shown his ability to recon-

struct a disorganized front. For a time at least, though heavy fighting continues in many localities, the German advance has come practically to a standstill from Leningrad to the Black Sea. Whether there will be an early renewal of the offensive on a great scale, or whether the Germans will be content for the present to carry out minor operations in order to improve their position prior to settling down for the winter, or with a view to initiating new operations when the ground is frozen, remains to be seen. Certainly it would be unwise to place reliance on Hitler's statement that on the Leningrad front his army will adopt a defensive policy during the winter; for there continuous frost may make it possible to complete the encirclement of the city; and distances to be covered are shorter than elsewhere.

Whatever German strategic policy will be it obviously must be governed largely by the state of their lines of communication. At the present time they must be particularly highly tested; since not only have they to maintain the flow of supplies of all sorts needed on a still active front of enormous length, but much restoration work must still remain to be carried out. In addition, stores urgently needed to meet winter conditions—winter clothing and above all engineering material required in connection with the provision of shelter and defensive works—must be carried in quantities which would congest the most efficient railway system. Protection of communications against guerrilla activities during long nights and when weather conditions make mobile counter-offensive protection difficult, is likely to become an increasingly serious problem. Immobile defence of such an immense stretch of vulnerable line would involve the employment of prohibitive numbers—the supervision of labour gangs of doubtful loyalty may also be difficult. Under such conditions it is hardly possible to believe that an early resumption of the offensive on its former scale is feasible.

Yet have the Germans accomplished enough to make it safe for them to leave the Russians time to exploit the recuperative power conferred on them by numbers, by allied assistance, and by their own industrial organization, whether still untouched or in process of reconstruction? Much as the German General Staff might welcome a comparatively quiet winter in which to reorganize, make good their losses and replenish their reserves they must, I think, continue the offensive, though on a diminished scale and in such parts of the front as would place least strain on their communications. If that is so relaxation of pressure on the Moscow front and continuation of the attempt to secure control of the whole of the Donetz region, with a possible extension of the drive to the lower Volga, would be the most obvious development. But alternatively a renewal of the offensive in the Leningrad region where German troops have had chances to recuperate and reorganize might offer possibilities of a more rapid and less exhausting success, and might lead up to a drive towards Vologda. The capture of Vologda would greatly reduce the value of Archangel and Murmansk as ports for allied material assistance. It is, however, questionable whether the Panzer Divisions are now in a condition

to undertake far-reaching operations. It has been reported that some have been broken up to assist infantry in short range operations. Whether this is due to Russian success in preventing the full development of Panzer tactics, to the deterioration of vehicles, or to the necessity of reinforcing the tank units normally employed for close co-operation, is doubtful. The latter must have of late been in constant use in infantry attacks, and have probably suffered heavily from enemy action and from mechanical deterioration.

What part the Crimean operations are designed to play in German strategy is speculative. Obviously the main object is to deny the use of Sebastopol to the Russian Black Sea Fleet. This would not necessarily involve the capture of the fortress since long range artillery fire and close air attack would make the naval base untenable. To complete the capture of the fortress might, however, involve costly attacks. The suggestion that the attack towards Kerch at the entrance to the Sea of Azov is intended to open the way for an invasion of northern Caucasia seems hardly to make sufficient allowance for the difficulties of such an operation; unless Russian power of defence had completely broken down. A very considerable quantity of shipping of one sort or another would be required to convey the invading army across the narrow straits, and, though an initial landing might be effected under cover of artillery fire and bombing attack, boats and ships would be very vulnerable to air counter-attack—and the Russian airforce is still very much in being. Crossing a river line where alternative points of attack can be found, facilitating surprise, is a different matter, and when a bridge-head has been secured bridges can be rapidly constructed. At Kerch the extent of narrow water offers few alternative landing places and it is too wide to bridge. An airborne invasion might be practicable, but few of the conditions would be as favourable as in Crete. The chief advantage in the case of Kerch would be in the inability of the Russian Navy to interfere with the ferrying of heavy material and reinforcements. That, however, would be a slow and precarious business under air attack. Invasion of Trans-Caucasia from Kerch would certainly entail much preparation and is therefore unlikely to be a development in the immediate future. The capture of the Kerch Peninsula would, however, give command of the entrance of the Sea of Azov and would eliminate a base from which aerodromes established in the Crimea, or a force left to invest Sebastopol might be attacked. That may be all the movement against it aims to achieve. Except so far as it affects the naval situation in the Black Sea the importance of the invasion of the Crimea is, I am inclined to think, exaggerated.

WAR-TIME PROPAGANDA

By Air-Commodore L. E. O. Charlton

THAT overworked word Propaganda, torn from home and context, may have found expression in the English language prior to the 1914-18 War, but it certainly burst into prominence, and became a phrase to conjure with, during the closing years of that great struggle. Then and since its military application has been wide and various to the cause of arms as a furtherance to victory, and our present foe has not disdained to learn a lesson from an outside source, and elevate it to a science. Propaganda has become to-day an extra 'column,' composed chiefly of artillery, ranging from the heavy armament of brazen falsehood, through the medium calibres of soft insinuation, to the lighter pieces that eject a sugared pill for home consumption. Many years ago a certain Chinese general found a novel use for his artillery. Instead of aiming at the front ranks of his foe he loosed off at the rear-most of his own advancing infantry, hoping in such a fashion to stimulate their progress towards victory. Propaganda can be so used, and sometimes is; more particularly when the home front needs resuscitation. But then it is a weapon of extremely delicate adjustment.

During one of Redvers Buller's several ineffectual efforts in Natal, at the time of the South African War, our advancing lines of infantry, painfully approaching the kopjes in which the enemy was ensconced, were refreshed and reinvigorated by the information, passed up from the rear and accompanied by cheers, that Mafeking had been relieved. Mafeking, in point of fact, was not relieved till five months later, the statement that was circulated to revive our drooping spirits being pure fabrication. It was traced eventually to Divisional Headquarters, the General Officer Commanding, brought up on Wolseley's Pocket-Book, having peppered us with small shot from the rear, according to the Chinese practice, for the purpose of hastening our progress.

In another category, but directed at the foe on this occasion, may be placed the hideous invention, which obtained such world-wide credence in the closing stages of the last great war, that the Germans boiled down the dead to recover the body's natural fats, and thus renew a supply of which they were seriously deficient. But the stream of war-time propaganda can be played so variously, and with such insidious effect, on the compound business of modern war that sometimes it is hardly recognizable as such.

Of this we have an instance in the booklets issued for the Air Ministry by

the Ministry of Information, the second of these publications, *Bomber Command*, having been distributed quite recently. Like its predecessor, *The Battle of Britain*, it is altogether a laudable affair, and without doubt those to follow on other prominent aspects of the fight above will maintain that standard of excellence. But it is unblushing propaganda all the same.

Of our three military Departments, the Air Ministry alone has condescended to enlighten the British public, and the world at large, on the achievements of its fighting personnel. We have also, it is true, *The Battle of Flanders* by Ian Hay. But that is merely a popular version of Gort's Official Despatches, and surely no one would suggest that a Commander-in-Chief's report on operations possesses propaganda value. The War Office have had an equal opportunity to produce their booklets out of the superabundant material at command, and for all we know the Minister of Information has been hammering at them to follow the example of Adastral House. So far, however, the Air Ministry has the field to itself, and will be wise to make good use of the monopoly. A young Service, particularly one with the romantic appeal of flight, can break new ground in this direction, for heroic stories of the air still have a breathlessness about them which, because the tale is old and endless, is not imparted by deeds of derring-do on land.

As for the Admiralty, what can one expect of a Department compared to which an oyster is loquacious? Partly, it is the tradition of the Sea Service to be silent, and, partly, naval methods and activities are so highly particularized that a seemingly inoffensive popular description of what goes on at sea might open enemy eyes and be fraught with danger to our cause. One can more readily imagine a Victorian duchess taking snuff than the Board of Admiralty subscribing their consent to a brochure on a sea offensive against the Axis submarines. Occasionally they do lift a corner of the veil, but only in the bald terms of a communiqué, leaving the embellishment of detail, under censorship, to the free Press of the country. The Air Ministry, on the other hand, thrust the pen into the hand of an official, allowing him the exercise of his descriptive genius with which to clothe the skeleton reports, a travel warrant on which to interview the personnel concerned, and licence to permit a certain length of flight to his imagination. None the less he writes to order and his pen is suspect as an implement of propaganda.

There is a subtle distinction between the two Air Ministry publications which have so far been issued that shows the delicacy of the instrument which is being handled. The *Battle of Britain*, for instance, is the recital of a victory that is past and done with, a hammer and tongs affair, concerning which the issues are presented in a manner plain for all to see. The enemy attacked and were repulsed during the course of a four months battle, and there one has it in epitome. How different the matter set forth in *Bomber Command*!

For with the latter there is depicted unending action without definite result, innumerable sorties with indeterminate effect on the objectives for attack, and a wide choice of action all the time. Here policy, the strategic consider-

ation, and the philosophy of the 'better 'ole,' come into play, with cruel losses sometimes undergone in a process of trial and error without commensurate result. The writer has a harder task this time, for he must inevitably display the seamy side of things to balance his account, and to cause his narrative to run. In only one particular are the two books like each other. In either case the flying personnel, pilots, navigators, and air crews in general, are cast in an heroic mould, defiant of danger, concentrated on their mission, and ever ready for the next time up.

Bomber Command may also be regarded as a strong corrective to the bland announcements by the B.B.C. and in the Press, where the officially communicated items of information are processed to make palatable reading, and hearing, for the general public. Wittingly, or unwittingly, it enables one to peep behind the scenes and realize that when such and such a number of bombers failed to return, a further proportion only just succeeded in so doing, and that the strain on air crews, in all the varying circumstances of successful, and unsuccessful, flight is immense, accumulative and unappreciated. How little was it known, in the earlier days of daylight raids by unescorted bombers against the Nazi ships-of-war off North West Germany, that we went by rule of thumb, or that we only desisted from such enterprises because of the huge expense incurred thereby. How strange to read of the intense care we exercised to confine attacks to purely military objectives in such cases. For the first six months only ships-of-war actually at sea, or lying in wide roadsteads, were attacked for fear of doing outside damage to civilian shore establishments, a naval vessel being thus immune should it happen to be alongside or even close to a quay. And then those leaflet raids! We suffered casualties in the course of such excursions, due for the most part to bad weather, but how could it ever have been thought that the enemy might be divided by such a futile process? On the very eve of Hitler's Norwegian campaign our bombers, returning from one of these 'paper litter' flights, saw streams of transport flowing on the Lubeck-Hamburg *autobahn*, with blazing headlights and no pretence of concealment. Near Kiel there was great shipping activity under the glare of arc lamps. These movements and activities were reported on return, but the ban on inland bombing held, even under such a provocation and the enemy's feverish preparation against Norway was not interfered with.

There is much more in the booklet of a similar tendency if it be closely read. It is, in fact, a curious propaganda effort. One rises from it with mute admiration for our air crews, but with a slight feeling of disillusionment for the policies they were engaged in implementing, and in some sense it reveals us to our enemy. There is a two-edged blade to the sword of propaganda, which requires, in the form thus presented, very skilful handling. Perhaps the two senior Services know best.

NAVAL STRATEGY IN THE EAST

By Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond

THE possibility that Japan might seize the opportunity when this country is committed to a great struggle in Europe to attack the Empire's interests and territories in Australia has never been absent from the minds of the Dominion peoples. A few years ago some writers in Australia, assuming that in such a case the whole British fleet would be needed in the European seas and that Australia would have to depend upon her own resources alone, urged that her efforts should be directed towards building up armed forces on the basis purely of local defence, and composed of an army, submarines, aircraft and mines. As the country is self supporting in food it could not be reduced by blockade, and therefore it would not be fatal, as it would be to Britain, if the trade routes were abandoned. In such a system cruisers would not be needed; the coastal routes, by which goods are so largely distributed, would be defended by the combination of minefields, submarines and destroyers. Fortunately wiser counsels prevailed. It was recognized that security was not to be obtained in isolation but in co-operation with the other parts of the Empire, and we have seen the army, instead of awaiting an attack at home, defending its country in the Western desert and in Singapore, and Australasian cruisers in action off River Plate and in the Mediterranean.

Japan did not act as she was expected to do, for she had an extensive engagement in China. There she has been a faithful follower of the German principle of "step by step" in the political strategy of her aggression, from Manchuria to Indo China. What the next step will be we do not know, though the information may come at any moment. In the breathing space that has been afforded to us since the fall of France—the most favourable moment for a stab in the back—the situation has developed in a manner that at least gives rise to sober satisfaction, even though the danger is still present. Mr. Churchill's words, in his speech at the Mansion House, are among the most important that have been spoken concerning the war at sea:

> Owing to the effective help we are getting from the United States in the Atlantic, owing to the sinking of the Bismarck, owing to the completion of our splendid new battleships and aircraft carriers, as well as the cowing of the Italian Navy . . . . we now feel ourselves strong enough to provide a powerful naval force with its necessary ancillary vessels, for service if necessary in the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

Here are four specific factors in the situation, every one of them of first-class importance. And there is a fifth of hardly less account—the great increase in our flotilla craft both on the surface and in the air. These have brought down the losses of our shipping from the very ominous figure of 300,000 tons a month to about 180,000 tons. In that increased flotilla strength

the part played by Canada merits a particular attention. A navy that consisted of no more than fifteen vessels and some 2,000 men has expanded to nearly 400 vessels and over 27,000 men. Since the bulk of the losses at sea—possibly as much as between three-fifths and four-fifths—are due to the submarines of the enemy, the importance of the flotilla craft of all types cannot be exaggerated, and the part which their growth plays in steadying the situation in the Far East is illustrated by the inclusion of " necessary ancillary craft " in the force available for the Far East.

Although submarines are responsible for the greater proportion of our losses of shipping, the surface ships of the heavy types have made a contribution both direct and indirect, to the German campaign; and the fact that the Prime Minister feels able to make a detachment of a " powerful force " is a reassuring sign. Grand-Admiral Raeder was an advocate of the *guerre de course* and expected great results from the surface attack on trade, and he had grounds for his expectations. Though the three British cruisers at the Battle of the Plate were able to put the Graf Spee out of action it needs to be remembered that their combined weight of fire was a bare three-quarters of that of the German armoured cruiser. The material odds were against them. Nor was it possible for us, with the insufficient numbers of cruisers to which the Treaty of London limited us, to afford convoy even in that strength to the whole of the trade of the North Atlantic alone. The Battleships had therefore to be called on, as they had been in earlier occasions of our cruiser shortage, to do what is called " cruiser work," and though the sally of the German battle cruisers inflicted a loss of some 20,000 tons of shipping, the convoys, protected by heavy ships, went in safety; and the two ships returned to Brest on March 21 to prepare for another raid, for which, according to a broadcast by Admiral Raeder, they were ready in April. The attentions however of Bomber Command had by then become so close that except for a short trip by one of them to La Pallice, apparently with the object of escaping those attentions, neither has been in a condition to resume her activities on the trade routes. Still, neither is yet permanently disabled, and until that shall have been achieved there will be a possibility of a repetition of their raiding that cannot be overlooked. The Bismarck followed the battle cruisers and met her fate, whereby we were relieved of a serious preoccupation; whether her sister ship, the Tirpitz, now in the Baltic, will be risked upon a similar venture remains to be seen. The prospect however is not an inviting one since the American fleet has added its efforts to ours, and the joint effect of this and of the reluctance of the Italian Navy to try conclusions with our Mediterranean fleet is, as the Prime Minister said, to enable us to detach if it should prove necessary, a strong force of powerful ships to the Far East.

The force, if sent, would be an auxiliary; it could not be the equal of the Navy of Japan. What the exact strength of that Navy now is cannot be stated with certainty, for a shroud has fallen over Japanese construction for

the last two or three years. It is not known whether the newest battleships, reputed to be as much as 40,000 tons, have been completed, though it is possible that two of them may be in service by now and a third during the course of the coming year. If that is so, the Japanese battlefleet may number thirteen ships of about 30,000 tons and over; and besides these a division of three or perhaps four smaller ships of from 12,000 to 15,000 tons, ships copied, it would seem from the "pocket battleships" of Admiral Raeder, but larger and more heavily armed; such ships might either form a fast division of the battle fleet, as the armoured cruisers did in Togo's battle tactics, or operate on the trade routes.

The Japanese cruiser forces consist of sixteen heavy ships of from 8,000 to 10,000 tons and fourteen lighter ships of about 5,000 tons. Behind these there is a force of not far from 100—it may by now be more—lesser vessels, cruisers of 3,000 tons and destroyers some of which would more correctly be termed cruisers than destroyers. Nine aircraft carriers and a submarine flotilla of certainly over four score craft complete the "ancillary" units of the Navy.

This is a formidable force, backed by its dockyards and shipbuilding establishments. So long as its duties should be confined to the defence of the country and other responsibilities in the neighbourhood of the main islands of the Japanese Empire it is fully equal to its task. But in embarking on a policy of expansion it has assumed additional responsibilities which will stretch its powers to the utmost if the government elects to provoke the United States to war; the first result of which, as the Prime Minister has made clear, would be to bring Great Britain in "within the hour." Japan has not only to guard herself against blockade and invasion, both of which are well within her competence: she has also armies abroad, all of whose communications are by sea—to Tientsin, Chinchiang, Canton and Indo China. All of the lines of communication of these armies will need the protection of the fleet against the cruiser and submarine forces of the United States and her ally. The commitments are considerable and must make heavy demands upon the destroyer flotilla and the cruiser forces, with a consequent weakening of his concentration. Nor would the transport fleets engaged in supplying the armies—in some cases over considerable distances—need protection against light and cruiser forces only; there would also be the allied battlefleet to consider. We have seen the disturbance caused by the heavy German ships and the need it imposed upon us to strengthen our escorts with battleships; but while in our case the attackers were few, and the British heavy forces superior, in the Eastern seas, in the situation that would arise, the attacking fleet would be superior; and it would not be possible to foresee at which of the several lines of military communication a blow might be struck. In our defensive campaign in the Atlantic the initiative has throughout lain with the enemy; in the East, the initiative would lie with the allies and, while the enemy in the Atlantic can only threaten the convoys with a raiding force which cannot accept action with the escort of heavy ships, in the East the

attackers could, with their superiority, press home an attack.

We have seen little of battlefleets in operation in the European seas in this war, for Germany has had no battlefleet and Italian strategy has not been directed towards gaining command of the sea; in the enclosed waters of the Mediterranean there has been less freedom of manœuvre and greater opportunities for the submarine and the aircraft. In the wider spaces of the China sea, and with forces of battleships not only much larger but also with a greater scope for action in the conditions created by the invasion of China by way of a number of sea routes, the part the battle fleets are capable of playing is considerable, for Japanese armies cannot be slipped furtively by night into Indo China, as Italian detachments can be thrown across the Sicilian Channel or German troops across the Kattegat. In the Russo-Japanese war the same risk was present. It was dealt with by the torpedo attack on the Russian fleet by the Japanese torpedo boats off Port Arthur before the declaration of war, after which, free for at least a time, from danger from the Russian battleships, the army was transported to its destination on the mainland. The success of that attack—it was an incomplete success—was due to a total lack of precaution on the part of the Russian commander. It is, we may reasonably hope, unlikely that a similar unreadiness would exist in the allied fleet during a time of strained relations such as those of to-day.

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EBB AND FLOW—A BOOK COMMENTARY

By Stephen Gwynn

FIRST things first. At such a time no writing is so much needed as the kind of poetry which lifts up the heart, and I am grateful to Desmond MacCarthy for his review in the *Sunday Times* which called my attention to *First Poems* by Richard Elwes.* First; but. in a sense, not new; what they have to say chiefly is old, for instance, as Thermopylæ. They are a confession of faith and every such confession needs to be perpetually re-affirmed; the man who can so re-affirm it as to help himself and others "to know the heart's contentment in the fight" is doing what Rupert Brooke did for his generation. The line I have quoted comes in a sonnet written "After hearing the Prime Minister" (on April 27 of this year), and the book itself is dedicated "To Anthony Eden"; thus allegiance is proclaimed to those who have done most to secure for England the perilous honour of leadership. There are in all only half a dozen of these sonnets which make up the confession of faith—and the first of them is, as it should be, addressed to Poland, behind whose resistance to encroaching tyranny England at last came out into her proper place.

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We had been winter-bound these later years
Starved in the frozen wasting of the soul.
That ended when out of Poland there came
A voice, a flame, a holy manfulness
That shouted 'Freedom!' and was glad, and died.

Died, yes, as they died at Thermopylæ; but from that day England has led the way to make sure that they did not die for nothing; nor those others who sleep in the British cemetery, somewhere in Picardy where the poet found another of his songs—

Not yours to be tormented by misgiving,
To wonder if the sacrifice was vain.
To weigh the worth of dying against living.

This voice of England is, of course, not solely concerned with war; there is the other perpetual cry from a young man's heart to all hearts that "have shouted verse, exulting, down the wind." The love poems in this little book lend themselves to such shouting. What we are asked nowadays to accept for poetry is no doubt written with enjoyment—or it would not be written; but so far as my observation reaches, it sends nobody abroad shouting it. Yet that is what poetry is for. This new poet has put a new song into our mouths, not the least disturbed to know that it is an old song. I am glad he calls his book *First Poems*; yet there was no need of such a promise as the title implies; a man who can write verse like this does not give up writing it. Utterance flows from him, fluent and effortless as a bird's song. He is in the great tradition; he takes up the torch, and, please heaven, will carry it far. Yet even if it dropped from his hand tomorrow, it burns the clearer since he lifted it.

* * * * *

Lord Halifax

Nothing in the world is more important to the world at present than that there should be good understanding between Great Britain and the United States; and Mr. Churchill showed how he valued the post of Ambassador to Washington when he sent Lord Halifax* there. The biography by Mr. Campbell Johnson, just published, lets us know that, although in times past there have been sharp disagreements between the two, Mr. Churchill has never shared the disparaging estimate of his colleague which has been found in many quarters. Such disparagement was not surprising: Lord Halifax is no showman of his qualities. But in the House of Commons characters reveal themselves and Mr. Churchill is too good a judge of courage not to have recognized a fine type of it in the quiet man who for four years before the European war sat on the back benches opposite him. In those years many of us, I think, became conscious that there was in Edward Wood much of the quality which we saw at its best in Edward Grey; though all I remember definitely is that he was one of a small group of Tory "Intellectuals" who from time to time came to discuss the Irish difficulty with a few of us Nationalists. The talking was mostly done by Amery, Samuel Hoare and George Lloyd; I cannot recall that Wood ever opened his lips; but he was a friendly presence and a presence that somehow carried weight. Later, the passage in his long career of office which captured many admirations was that at which Mr. Churchill was vehement against him—when in spite of numberless oppositions, he decided to receive Gandhi at Government House. Mr. Campbell Johnson does full justice to this episode and we may be thankful to him, not only for presenting the facts with eloquence, but for giving them their proper background. Yet to me at least

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there has been more enlightenment from the early pages which make us understand the man's inheritance and education—above all, the relation with his father. I select one revealing touch. When he was offered the Indian Viceroyalty and doubted as to acceptance (for reasons chiefly of personal affection) Wood went up to the family home in Yorkshire to discuss the question with Lord Halifax, then aged eighty-six. The old man told him not to mind consequences, but consider what was right: "What we must do is to say our prayers." So they went to church together, it being a saint's day, and when they came out, Halifax said, "Well, I think you ought to go." "So do I," replied his son. "Then that's settled and don't let us talk about it any more."

Altogether the book gives a revealing account of a man whom we have good reason to like and admire, even though it shows him deeply involved in a deplorable misdirection of affairs. Lord Halifax (as he had become when he was at the Foreign Office) was admirably unselfish; yet a more ambitious minister might, with advantage, have been less self-effacing. He allowed Mr. Chamberlain with Sir Horace Wilson to over-ride the Foreign Office until Great Britain was committed to accepting a peace at any price, the price being paid by Czechoslovakia. It is good to have it made clear that Lord Halifax did his full part to ensure that there should be no repetition of Munich, and we may well agree with his biographer that when the war is won, few men are so likely to be of value in the task of peace making.

I should like to praise the book unreservedly; but the 'jacket' conveys the fact that its writer has plenty of time before him, so that criticism need not be futile. Even recognizing that Lord Halifax has held nearly all leading posts except the financial, and has been in office for nearly twenty years, still 565 long pages are too many. Mr. Johnson has not learnt the art of selecting the essential, and much too often he repeats at length newspaper comment. He is lacking in simplicity and clearness:—as for instance here:

> In reply to Daladier's firm reassertion of the Czech alliance, Chamberlain and Halifax simply repeated the formula of 24 March, repudiating commitments in advance of the event, but there were no illusions on either side that an invasion of Czechoslovakia would almost certainly lead to a general war, involving France's integrity and therefore British intervention.

Mr. Johnson appears also less than happy in his choice of words, as when he says: "All Churchill's blandishments failed to produce the response." 'Blandishments' carries a somewhat denigratory suggestion, and for good or bad I never heard or read a speech by Mr. Churchill which was, as we say in Ireland 'soothering' in quality. Again he has a passion for the word 'underwrite' by which he means sometimes to 'support,' and sometimes to 'guarantee.' Since many of us are very uncertain what exactly underwriting is or means, it is better to avoid this neologism. Again, when he attributes to Lord Halifax "resolute inaction" and "a tendency to rely on sound second best," he comes perilously near praising with faint damns—which is certainly the very last result he would wish to achieve. He has written so valuable a book on so noble a subject that one is distressed because he has not written it with more technical accomplishment.

* * * * *

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chair. He began early with apprenticeship to the School of Archæology in Athens; after a dozen years spent in teaching, he went on to claim his place in the British forces that fought for freedom on Greek soil—serving as Intelligence officer at Salonica from 1915 to 1919. Only after this interlude he returned to the study of the ancient language and literature—which are so far from being dead that in moments of political excitement, as he tells us, passages in the plays of Sophocles, or the orations of Pericles, have been barred from public recitation. The book shows the continuity of Greek character; no other people was ever so passionately interested in the business of government, or so difficult to govern. The changes of ministry which it has to chronicle, especially in the periods of republican rule, were too kaleidoscopic for any clear pattern to emerge. But upon one point Professor Forster is insistent: the Greek is a first-rate fighting man. Italy's repulse proved that, even to the minds of those Englishmen who thought that cleverness and fighting quality did not go together. Mr. Forster knows also and shows how strong a motive patriotism is with this race, when it is not bedevilled by party politics. As another witness in support of this view, I should bring forward Paul Morand whose very cynical novel, *Lewis et Irene*, studies the marriage of a young French financier and the daughter of an old Greek banking house. When the marriage breaks up, the wife is more than able to hold her own in the financial struggle; the Frenchman only gets the better of her when she must raise a large sum to prevent a Greek island from passing under foreign rule. Then he knows that he can blackmail her patriotism.

In spite of the bewildering succession of ministerial names, certain personages emerge clear—chiefly Venizelos who might be called the hero of the book, yet is shown as thoroughly a Greek in certain lapses from discreet statesmanship. General Metaxàs also appears in a strong light—not to his discredit; and lesser persons like M. Zaimis are in their way admirably shown. As to the characters of the ruling house, Mr. Forster proves by citation of captured documents those pro-German tendencies in Constantine and his Queen which were confidently denied before the Dardanelles Commission, by at least one high-placed British official. The Allied Powers in that war and before it did not treat Greece with sympathy or with wisdom; yet it is plain from this book that they were hard set to discover what Greece really wanted to do and could do. The closing chapter of general commentary is full of interest; but I regret that Mr. Forster has not interrupted his review of politics and war to show how Greece dealt with the problem of absorbing great numbers of her nationals, flung back on her from Asia Minor. Such transfer of population may need to be carried out in many places and Greece has shown that the thing can be done with profit to the country which receives such influx.

* * * * *

A Rebel Spanish Boy

Spain has never been so cut off from Europe as Greece was during the centuries of Turkish rule; yet the people which Señor Arturo Barea describes in his book *The Forge** seem to an English reader curiously savage. Yet perhaps only mediæval, as compared with the Europe that we all know. At all events there is no doubt as to the impression left by this piece of autobiography which covers only the boyhood and adolescence of a man whose life, as his translator says, has forged him into a rebel against society. The translator is Sir Peter Chalmers Mitchell and admirably he has done his work. It was no easy matter to secure at secondhand the vividness which is Señor Barea's chief characteristic. He

*Faber. 10s. 6d.

shows the life of Madrid as it looked to a boy whose existence was unnaturally divided between poverty and *bourgeois* comfort; for he lived with a well-to-do uncle and aunt while his mother whom he loved spent her days working as a washerwoman. The friends that he made while he was with her were very different from the youngsters with whom he went to school; and these schoolfellows knew him for the child of a washerwoman and made him feel that they knew it. Schoolboys even in civilized schools have a deal of the savage about them; and they have a peculiar intensity of vision which is doubled and trebled under such conditions as *The Forge* describes. A reviewer is bound to warn readers that for many passages they will need strong stomachs—and also that the anti-clericalism of this book is such as can only be found where priests have powers that most of us would think excessive. The author makes his view very plain that celibacy does not work easily in the Spanish church. His truest friend, the big Basque priest who charms the birds like St. Francis, one day suddenly introduces Arturo to his wife and son. But for those who can stand strong meat the book is well worth attention and the translator gives in a brief introduction a vivid sketch of the author's life. But he certainly does not make a reader wish to have been born a Spaniard.

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THE LOST PEACE, by Harold Butler. *Faber & Faber.* 10*s.* 6*d.*

If science and the attendant djinn which we call technical progress have revealed the titanic possibilities of the human mind, the events of the past twenty years have assuredly exposed its limitations. The facts of community and interdependence established by the conquest of distance are there for all the world to see; and there has certainly been no lack of preaching on that text. Men in all countries have desired peace as never before: as Mr. Butler accurately observes, when 'the balloon went up' in September, 1939, the hatred and dread of war had never been so general or so genuine as then—even the Germans "somehow hoped and believed that their hopes and ambitions could be achieved without war." Yet here we are, lost in the vale of blood and tears, as incapable of rational living, apparently, as any mindless beasts of the field. It all goes to show that experience, and nothing else, will impart wisdom; for individuals or for nations the lesson is the same, there is no short cut that provides a substitute—and the school fees are heavy. An obvious example, which Mr. Butler does not fail to cite, is the deep-seated sense of insular security that continued to govern Britain's attitude throughout the inter-war period—(before the bombs fell). As for France the Vichy period is well described here as a purgatory; and we are warned not to throw stones since "we too were duped, short-sighted, vacillating and intensely pacific—until war was actually upon us." But, actually, the psychic time-lag, as one may call it, was general: the lost peace is explained primarily, says Mr. Butler, by the fact that the great majority of people everywhere were thinking of the world in nineteenth-century terms. That is the message of one who has had perhaps a unique opportunity of *personal experience.*

Few indeed can look back upon such a record of service to humanity and first-hand knowledge of international affairs as that of the Warden of Nuffield College. His work at the International Labour Office, which he abandoned after eighteen years rather than yield to pressure for the making of a 'political convenience' appointment brought him into contact with the leaders, but also the common folk, of all nations. And like his great chief, M. Albert Thomas, he has always believed in going 'to see for himself.' For such a man travel is indeed a matchless education, because the windows of his mind are, to begin with, flung wide open. So, though this book is only a modest sheaf of gleanings from Mr. Butler's rich harvest—he does not draw on any official data or confidential information—it should be widely read as the quintessence of sense and sensibility in regard to contemporary international affairs.

Mr. Butler starts, as one should, with reflections on politics induced by travel.

> Now is the time . . while we are still under the spell of the baleful star of Teutonism to recall what the real world was like and to wonder what it may again become. It was a good world for all its folly, misery and evil, and will be so again—perhaps an even better world, cleansed of some of its uglier vices and meannesses.

What he has to say about political Geneva, mirror of men's failures and disappointments and pettinesses, about France, Germany the Danubian dilemma and so forth is trite enough and does not go very deep; but it is distinguished by the writer's easy manner and, at times, rare felicity of expression. Without letting off any Vansittartine fireworks Mr. Butler sees clearly that we must go forward to the utter destruction of German

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power, that nothing less will do because of the "spiritless docility of the German people." And he command Germany's economic evils will not be enough, "for German nationalism becomes more overweening in good times than in bad."

It is when he goes on to discuss "Questions for To-morrow," perhaps, that Mr. Butler's ripe wisdom is particularly valuable. After the war we shall need not merely, as before, a grim determination to make sure that it never happens again but above all, "an understanding of the radical change in outlook and practice which is necessary to secure that end." The accent, as the context shows, is on the word 'radical'; and the counsel is all the more to be heeded because the author goes on with his crystalline common sense to enumerate the "stubborn and conflicting realities" that will have to be reconciled. He warns against blue prints and panaceas such as federal unions—establishment of the new order will—and must—be an empirical affair, building patiently stone by stone from the bottom upwards out of the materials that the war itself will have placed at our disposal; cites the British experience not as a pattern but as an example that specific arrangements for defence and economic co-operation do not require the creating of any new constitutional bond; speaks temperately and sensibly about Russia and the relations of the U.S.S.R. and of Britain to Europe—we cannot escape the obligations of our dual rôle, as European and non-European entity; and ends with the simple but usually overlooked conclusion that in the long run international like any other human affairs will prosper only when the Christian doctrines of love and charity have become common motives of action—become common motives of action.

W. Horsfall Carter.

CHURCH & STATE IN FASCIST ITALY, by D. A. Binchy. *Oxford University Press.* 31*s.* 6*d.*

> Wherever there is power in the universe, that power is the property of God, the King of that universe—His property of right, however for a time withholden or abused.

On that text Mr. Gladstone preached his famous sermon, "The State in its relations with the Church," just about a century ago. The problem which he was discussing goes, however, much further back than that. Without tracing it back to the days of the Emperor Constantine we cannot forget that for a thousand years it has been present to the minds of English statesmen, that it was inherent in the famous *Consuetudines* of so strong a churchman as William the Conqueror, that it was at the root of the quarrel between Rufus and Anselm, of that between Henry II. and Becket, of John and Pope Innocent III. It was solved, for the time, by the Erastian legislation of Henry VIII. but it has never ceased to perplex politicians and ecclesiastics.

Most of all does the problem present itself as practically insoluble in Italy. For in Italy it is—or until 1929 was—complicated by the fact that the Head of the Church Universal was also a Temporal Prince exercising sovereignty in one of the many States into which until 1861 Italy was divided.

The problem was, of course, accentuated when "Italy entered Rome" and Victor Emmanuel made Rome for the first time the capital of a united Italy. The Duce and Pope Pius XI. hoped and believed that they had solved it by the Lateran Treaties of 1929.

Mr. Binchey's scholarly treatise make it clear that the problem has not been solved. Though he writes presumably as a Catholic, his work is, if not "detached" admirably impartial. Its theme is, indeed, rela-

tively restricted, for his work deals not with the problem of Church and State at large but with the problem in relation to the Fascist régime in Italy.

The author is particularly severe upon, not to say deeply resentful of the statement of "the Anglican Bishop of Durham" in 1938. Bishop Henson said:

> Italy presents a woeful spectacle of the Church of Christ, in its proudest version of prelatical pretension tied hand and foot to an aggressive tyranny.

It is not "tied hand and foot" says Mr. Binchy. Whether the Church has in fact gained or lost by the "Reconciliation" is indeed, a matter of acute controversy. Says Mr. Binchy:

> Outwardly the Church has beyond all doubt gained in power and prestige since the Reconciliation. Fascism likes to do everything on a grand scale, and the imposing religious functions that accompany its numerous conventions and demonstrations are no exception . . . . Fascism in other words seeks to annex the Church to participate in its world-wide dominion, and to make the cause of universal Fascism synonymous with that of Catholicism. To have any hope of success in this ambitious project it must naturally begin with Italy.

But while "the religious policy of the Dictatorship," as Mr. Binchy admits, "aims ultimately at depriving the Church of that autonomy," which is one of the essentials of the Christian faith" the Church is on its guard against the dangers "covering the régime with bouquets while working in secret to counteract its more dangerous tendencies." This he is careful to add is "an unheroic policy," but "the future may justify their long suffering attitude."

This is profoundly true. Whether, as Mr. Binchy asserts: "The Papacy has on the whole succeeded in convincing most impartial observers that it remains completely free from the influence of the Italian Fascist State" is surely a much more disputable proposition.

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MAKE AND BREAK WITH THE NAZIS, by Hermann Rauschning. Translated from the German by E. W. Dickes. *Secker & Warburg.* 8*s.* 6*d.*

Herr Rauschning is a very industrious writer, but one of the authors who can always claim to attract and to hold the interest of the public. It is—as in this case—the personality of the author as well as his work that commands the reader's attention and this last of Herr Rauschning's books is perhaps therefore the most interesting of them all because it is much more personal than the others. It is written as a confession, as a sort of apology for his past. Obviously he thinks it necessary to offer an explanation for his former adherence to Naziism. Since he left the party and took refuge in the western democracies he has always been a very much discussed person. A man who so obviously changed his political front and turned from a partizan into an adversary of Hitler is bound to be.

There are in this country certain groups who are looking upon him as the representative leader of a post-war Germany organized on a modern and democratic conservatism. However by the publication of his second book *Hitler Speaks* Herr Rauschning has lost a great deal of credit in England and also among his fellow émigrés. He was charged with having remained a National Socialist, although he knew that it was Goering who had set the *Reichstag* on fire. Angrily he demands to know what good his opposition would have done in 1933 and why he should "invite assassination." He asks the socialist members of Parliament why they did not allow themselves to be assassinated instead of running away? He stayed however in the party until the end of 1934 when he resigned his post as President of the Danzig Senate.

Why did he enter the party at all? He tries to explain this by what the famous Austrian author Hugo von Hofmannsthal called a "conservative revolution." Sounds paradoxical, does it not? But we have to acknowledge that there were a great many men like him in Germany, men of honest national convictions who were opposed to the Republic of Weimar, not because it was a republic and did its best to behave as a democratic state is supposed to, but because they believed it to have taken the wrong road. The conservative revolutionaries advocated a federal state within Germany. It was to be a federation, not only of territorial members, but of all sorts of fields of activity, such as Church, trade, industry, science and social organizations which should have certain spheres of sovereignty delegated to them by the whole. This programme may be rather vague, but at any rate it was not reactionary.

Herr Rauschning is an implacable adversary of Social Democracy, and cannot find anything good in Marxism. He puts the responsibility for the development in Germany not so much on "the mass propaganda of this one party of Naziism" as on "the materialist conception of history which has worked for years to spread among the mass its shallow, stupid materialism, and to praise this as progress. For three generations the political left wing in Germany has been at work to destroy Christianity." And full of bitterness he charges the Socialists with "wanting to disown their product."

It does not seem probable that many readers in this country will follow Herr Rauschning in this argument. The German Socialists have committed grave errors—nobody will deny that. But to lay exclusively at their doorstep the monstrosity of National Socialism is unjust. The responsibility for

the arrival of Hitler lies not with Weimar and the Socialists alone. It lies also with Hugenberg, Thyssen, Krupp, Kirdorf and those other industrial barons who set Hitler into the saddle because they expected him to crush Social Democracy. The responsibility lies furthermore with the Prussian *Junkers* and officers who greeted Hitler as the re-creator of Prussian military might. And Dr. Rauschning, don't forget the responsibility lies also with you and with your fellow conservative reformers, who in their hate against Weimar turned to Hitler imagining that they could tame him into the champion of *Civilization and Christianity*.

ERNST KLEIN.

NEW HORIZONS, by J. T. Murphy. *The Bodley Head.* 15*s.*

Had Mr. Murphy foreseen the events of the late summer and autumn of 1941 I think he might have planned his book not as an autobiography but as a straightforward narrative of the events in Russia from the establishment of the Third International to the present day. That would have left much of his present story untold for Mr. Murphy has been connected intimately with momentous happenings at home as well as with even more epoch making events abroad. Indeed Mr. Murphy has two very fine stories to tell and although it is true that the two stories are linked in fact as well as in the person of the author I would have preferred their presentation in separate volumes. As it is the mind does not switch easily from Sheffield to Leningrad, from Moscow to London.

But the book is an autobiography, and no man ever had better material for his autobiography than Mr. Murphy. His whole life has been spent vividly in the present, looking forward with hope and never regretfully back. That is a great achievement in itself and if one occasion-

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ally loses sight of Murphy in the swirl of deep political waters it is always with the knowledge that he will emerge again swimming confidently towards the shore of socialism.

Mr. Murphy was Manchester born and was early at work hawking bread and cakes, baked by his mother, and running a milk round for a local farmer. His mother, whom he loved dearly, helped him to study and at one time it was his ambition to enter the Civil Service. The death of his father killed this ambition and having taken his first proper job at 13 as a check-boy at Vickers' Brightside works (11 hours a day for six shillings a week) he continued as an engineer.

A strong religious background caused him to become for a short time a local preacher but he abandoned Christianity as later he was to abandon the Communist Party and found satisfaction in the tremendous class struggle which was developing between masters and men in the shops. In the Shop Stewards Movement he played an important rôle and was assistant secretary to the first "National Administrative Council." 1920 found him on the road to Moscow, an adventurous journey conducted without the proper visas. From then on he was in the forefront of Russian politics with a seat on the High Executive of the Communist International. He worked and talked with Lenin, knew Stalin, Zinoviev, Radek, Bucharin and others intimately and moved the expulsion of Trotsky from the Communist International in 1926.

Earlier in that year Mr. Murphy was helping to organize the strikers in the English General Strike and the year before he had been sentenced to six months imprisonment following a raid on the Communist headquarters. An insight is given into Mr. Murphy's character when he relates how he was the first prisoner to be called by Mr. Justice Swift and as a first offender given the choice between prison and leaving the Communist Party; he chose prison.

As this is an autobiography it seems hardly necessary to debate Mr. Murphy's political views. All I would say is that I wish half our politicians would hold their own views half as sincerely. Mr. Murphy's life is an example to all who believe that part at least of man's purpose in this life is to seek truth and to seek it courageously and without hypocrisy. Nor have his experiences made him bitter. To-day he is as thrilled by life as ever he was, determined that the old world of tyranny shall pass away and that a new and better world shall take its place.

JOHN ARMITAGE.

NEW ENGLAND: INDIAN SUMMER, by Van Wyck Brooks. *Dent.* 18*s.*

New England: Indian Summer was published in the United States over a year ago. Its appearance in this country, long overdue, is deeply welcome, and its publishers are less to be censured for their delay than congratulated for taking their courage in both hands and making available the sequel to *The Flowering of New England* which they published some years ago. That courage should be required for the launching of such a major work of American criticism, even in wartime, is a fact to be deplored: it is nevertheless a fact. It is equally a fact that if this exciting, penetrating and beautifully written study fails to interest the British reading public, it will stand convicted of parochialism and lazy-mindedness. For not even ignorance of the authors Mr. Van Wyck Brooks delineates is sufficient excuse for neglecting his history, for he is as stimulating to the ignorant as he

is illuminating for the informed. His enthusiasm for his enquiry imparts itself to the reader: as one reads, it is not merely *The Education of Henry Adams* which one resolves to read again, but, seeing them for the first time in their place in Mr. Brooks's mosaic, one is tempted to explore the New England novels of Mary Wilkins or John W. De Forest's stories of the Civil War. All the same, in the main Mr. Brooks's history records names more familiar to the average English reader than those of his preceding volume. Henry James, Henry Adams—these are the figures whose life span equates most nearly with this history and who personify more than anyone else the development of the New England mind during the period of its "Indian Summer." These, and William Howells, who in England and in America has slipped somehow from his niche beside the others, though in his sane, rounded, sympathetic humanity he kept in step with the changing generation and even harnessed in his work the forces beneath which his contemporaries suffered themselves to be crushed. Achievement number one of Mr. Brooks's study is his reassessment of Howells as an American-sized novelist of America, at a time when in other authors the feeling for their region had waned and awareness of their continent had not dawned.

The reassessment of Howells goes side by side, naturally enough, with a revised estimate of Henry Adams and Henry James. They are shown, without blame indeed, but without extenuation either, as New Englanders who failed to rise to the full stature of their tradition, through failure properly to realize where that tradition lay. Henry Adams the would-be reformer of 1870, disappointed to find the times out of joint, baulked of the power which was what he most wanted, turns into the

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rationalizer of *The Education*, finding the world "chaotic and futile" because as such it provided "an excuse for the futility and chaos of his own existence." James, failing to find in Boston the values, artistic and social, that he sought, finds that in the England he admires he can strike no real roots and cannot rid himself of his New England encumbrance of morality until he divests his art also of all content for his creations and turns his own perplexities into pale ghosts, techniques doing service for realities.

As these examples suggest, Brooks's criticism is never mere *literary* criticism. He dedicates his book to Lewis Mumford, and just as Mumford found the history of his America visible in architecture, so Brooks finds his New England history articulate in literature. This is the core of his achievement, here as in *The Flowering of New England*: his book is really the history of a tradition, a tradition never so alive as when it is being articulate, whether in praise or rebellion, but a tradition which is always something more than any single statement of itself, a life which is never fully mirrored in any single moment of its living. To the succession of moments which, with extraordinary skill, Brooks has arranged into a patterned whole, he has added something of himself and his own feeling for the tradition he describes.

H. G. NICHOLAS.

I, TOO, HAVE LIVED IN ARCADIA, by Mrs. Belloc Lowndes. *Macmillan.* 15*s.*

Mrs. Belloc Lowndes will forgive and even appreciate the small twinge of disappointment which came while reading the first chapters of her book. The subtitle, "a record of love and childhood," indicated momentarily a biography of Mr. Hilaire Belloc's early years. But long before the conclusion there was a feeling of gratitude that she did not allow her admiration for her brilliant brother to confine her theme. The reader would have missed knowing the gracious and affectionate Belloc family with their intellectual and artistic capacities, their wide range of interests and their good manners. As it is, every character held up produces a separate sparkle and, moreover, in grandparents, aunts, uncles, father and mother may be traced the qualities that helped to form the astonishing literary ability of the contemporary Hilaire and the good judgment and sensibility of his sister.

Intelligent people in the eighteen-hundreds were given to long letters reflecting the trends of thought and action of the day. The spaciousness, the leisure, the comfort of this French home limited the outlook of these particular writers of course, so that they could not always discern imminent change. However, the English daughter-in-law, mother of Hilaire and Marie, supplied the deficiency and many passages of her correspondence are full of perception and prevision. Taken as a whole the letters provide a convincing picture of a way of life which in France, at any rate, seems more civilized than Victorian England even at its best could produce. How *sensible* was the upbringing of the two children at La Celle St. Cloud, for instance, and surely modern dietetics could not have improved upon the Belloc meals!

The family lived through a turbulent period of French history. Some of them remembered 1812 and most of them the revolution of 1848. (Those who were introduced to the Duc de Praslin in the recent film, *All this, and heaven too*—and millions must have heard of him then for the first time—will be moved by the strange footnote to his story on page 311). The Bellocs were to witness the horrors of Paris and its surroundings during 1870-71, of the

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abdication of Napoleon III and of the Paris Commune. Nearly every one of the letters of this period is reminiscent and the temptation to quote becomes irresistible:

From the English daughter in 1868 when she heard of the revolution in Spain:

> It looks to me as if it may be the striking of a match which may in time set Europe on fire . . . . That Europe will undergo radical changes, is, I think, evident.

From her again in 1870:

> Should France be beaten—which God forbid—the whole balance of Europe will crash into shivers. Prussia seems to me now to stand in the same relation to Europe as did the First Napoleon sixty years ago.

From Adelaide de Montgolfier at the beginning of the siege of Paris:

> A good many people are buying provisions . . . . But I should be ashamed of doing any hoarding.

And later from her:

> We have all been horrified to hear that the Prussians are printing and publishing a daily newspaper in French. In that paper Paris is described as dying of hunger and nearly beaten . . . . The people of the city are more united than they have ever been . . . . I notice with amusement that all sorts of people who thought they were ill, have got well.

And finally, from Lily Ballot, sent by balloon post during the siege:

> It pains me to see poor people carrying along their little bits of furniture, often with the help of their tiny children . . . . The Prussians are using an enormous number of bombs . . . . You will be sorry to hear that a bomb has fallen on the Library of Sainte Genevieve . . . . The Sorbonne has also been struck, and quite a number of schools. We have now had thirty nights of bombing.

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PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY GEERINGS OF ASHFORD, LTD., 80. HIGH STREET, ASHFORD, KENT
PUBLISHED IN ENGLAND